

94
Say - Work was a little
without it he wd not
This wd deter future work.

31 Spencer St

West. Cliff

36, BUCKINGHAM GATE.

S.W.

Ramsay

November 27

Dear Mr. Buxton, -

I am writing for my husband
who is not allowed to use his eyes
at present. - He wishes me to say
that he is to day sending off his
final accounts of the Balkan War
Relief Fund, & is very sorry indeed
that illness has prevented his doing

So before. -

As they are in rather a big packet
& may not be forwarded to you, if
away, he thought it best to let
you know this & that two cheques
(for £70. & £2. 1.0) are enclosed.

My husband is feeling rather hurt
that after doing his best all through
last winter & Spring in the Balkans

for his own Chiefs while working
for the Fund - often under very trying
conditions - the Foreign Office
have seen fit to put him on half
pay almost - from the moment of
his arrival in England on sick
leave. - It is not only the loss of
£50. a quarter, I think, that he feels
so much as the utter disregard

of the strain & hardships undergone
which I cannot help feeling went far
towards wrecking his health,
we have been here for the last
five weeks & I think at last there
is some improvement — though
slow. —

With kind regards from my husband
Yours sincerely
Margaret Young

31 Spencer St^h

West Cliff

Ramspali

Dec 2.


Dear Mr. Buehler. —

Very many thanks for
your kind letter & suggestion,
which I have read to my
husband. — He does not wish

to lay undue stress on the
hardship of his half a dozen
trips across the Rhodes
under War Conditions, but
he reported consistently to
the F. O. (as well as to your
Committee) during the whole
time & he will be Sincerely

grateful if you will
help him in the way
you kindly suggest. —

With very many thanks
indeed, from myself,
yours sincerely
Mayaout Young



Reply -

Confidential

Prospectus

For the

House

of

Members of B.C.C.

Abbott



British Embassy

Theoplia

27. July. 1903.

Dear Mr Bunliss -

I have put off answering your suggestions to Lady Young until I could make some enquiries for you - I have of late rather lost touch of things macedonian. It will perhaps best explain my difficulty in being of any use to you if I admit that in spite of every precaution against giving offence I found ^{that my interest in macedonia} it was ~~injuring~~ my usefulness here in other ways and had better be dropped.

Sincerely sympathetic with yours

object and think I understand what you
require. In the first place you will have to
establish relations locally. This can best be
done by a visit to the Country when you can
get a personal relations with the Counts and
with such local connections as they have. Graves
Fontana & meffre are all close men - and
though the first & last are new to the place they
are unprejudiced and know the natives. Old
Biliotti's retirement is a good thing for you; he
was determinedly philo-turk. as a special
agent I would suggest abbott who is
now writing for the Chimiele and recently
wrote a readable ~~and~~ book which had more in

it than a rather airy style led me to expect.

I don't know him personally but his work is good and none of the ^{local} men with the necessary qualifications have his qualities. The deviant takes all grit and go out in one generation as a rule. I would also suggest an interview with Mateoff - Bulgarian agent at Adrianople a very enlightened Bulgar - who as an Anglophile would be likely to help you and wouldn't play you tricks -

Finally if you want ~~some~~ head quarters for a stay in the country there is an attractive house on the Bosphorus to be had cheap for two months or under - belonging to our judge, with rooms for six or so and ready for immediate occupation - servants etc. - you can take a header from the bedrooms into the Bosphorus - you might do worse if you want

to get up the question on the spot, and there
is no other way with this particular business.

I shall put off writing more fully
until I know whether there is any chance
of meeting you here this summer.

There is a good deal more to be said
than you have got in your proof "prospectus"
but the limitations of space and readability
make it as good as can be made -

I have suggested a redraft of your
postulates -

If there is anything else in which I
can be of use at present let me know - it will
be a satisfaction to be able to do something
while waiting for better times -

Yours truly
George Peckham.

I would not be in a hurry to circulate the
prospectus there will probably be a fresh outbreak
in the autumn.

ack by letter

a

Formosa (amb
Cookham

Beds.

Monday.

My dear Noel

I am just back from Constantinople where, as you know, I have been working in cooperation with the Americans on Angora and Lausanne to save the Constantinople Christians, whom that ass Nansen had thrown over, and whom our helpless diplomats had given up for lost. I want now to try and secure that the party should get some credit for its contribution, possibly a considerable one to Curzon's volte face on the question. There is also still some danger lest ~~we~~ ^{he} compromise the position he has now taken up as protector of the Christians by insisting on unessential points like the maintenance of the Patriarch at Constantinople. These, combined with the absence of any such acceptance on our part of the Turkish National Pact and Fundamental Statute ~~is~~ ^{is} we might well have made going to make acceptance by Angora and the army very difficult. I think a pronouncement on policy by the party might be made very helpful (a) in preventing a breakdown, (b) in putting us on a better footing with the Turks & (c) in securing for the party the sympathy of the religious element in the electorate.

I should like to see both Ramsay MacDonald and Henderson

about this if I have your support in trying to get something ^{said} done.
Can I see you Wednesday and, with you, see them afterwards? Any
arrangement you make for Wednesday or Thursday would be very
acceptable. Telephone me instructions - Bourne End 43. Don't write.
Before 10a.m. or after 5 p.m. are safest times.

I enclose copy of one of the memoranda I sent to the Americans
at Lausanne and of another written for Angora.

Ever yours

George Young.

I agreed with the armenians (whom I was helping
in making terms with the Turks) that all action in
respect of Constantinople should be taken in respect of the
Greeks. Any concessions to the Greeks would benefit
the armenians without compromising their negotiations
with the Turks? Using poles as rallying points?
? Saving poles for trouble?

TELEPHONE:
WESTERN 8883.

12, HOLLAND STREET,
W. 8.

27. Feb. 1940.

My dear Noel

Thanks for the enclosed. I
don't think the road to peace lies
way of conceding so much of what
we went to war about) that there is
nothing much left to fight about, is
? open any longer. The only way
in which useful road work can
now be done is by promulgating
a new principle and procedure by
applicable to either a diplomatic
or declared peace and capable of
democratic development. I think
this can be done by using the
new fashion of Federalism.

Yours
Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Came and see us - now we are
settled here in the dolls house in
which we went through the last war.

TELEPHONE:
WESTERN 5752

37, WARWICK GARDENS,
W. 14.

13. Nov. 1939.

My dear Noel

Here is what you asked for: If
you send it to Halifax call his
attention to the development of his
thesis which will ensure his reading
it. Let me know later; if you can,
whether he is likely to make any
use of it as far as I hear, I will
make no further use of it myself.

If it were not for the Spanish
tragedy I should not believe it
possible that our slave masters could
be so bankrupt as to let real warfar
develop out of the present deadlock.
But as we have exceeded King's
demerit I suppose we may
eventually perish ourselves -

Yours
George Young.
I think that such suggestions have a
better chance if left anonymous provided
they are adequately sponsored.

TELEPHONE:
WESTERN 5752.

37, WARWICK GARDENS,
W. 14.

16 Nov. 1939.

Dear Rod

Let me have that memo. back
if you're not sending it on to
Halifax. It was written for that
purpose and is suitable for no
other. Also I have another
channel to him and the time
is ripe for it.

Yours
Cecil King.

TELEPHONE:
WESTERN 8883.

FROM SIR GEORGE YOUNG, BART.
12, HOLLAND STREET,
W.8.

sd send his name?
- 13/11/1914

Dear Noel.

Here you are - If you want to proceed
so I say much hope you will - you can
send a copy of this to Churchill or Eden
saying it has been sent you in confidence
and what do they think of it - If they ask
who sent it you - you can say it is an
authorities who does not want to accept
responsibility for it - Ed some friends like that
yours G.Y.

George Young
Apr 2 1915

LYMORE END,
LYMINGTON,
HANTS.

The following is assumed:-

- (a) That the advance of Bulgarian troops into Thrace is in view of the Dardanelles deadlock, the diplomatic desideratum of most importance-
- (b) That it can be got in return for reasonable assurance of Monastir and Kavalla after the war-
- (c). That we alone can get it and we only.

The question is how can such assurance be given to Bulgaria- not merely a promise of good offices but a definite, if// informal assignment. Serbia and Greece will resist any such assignment by every device of Balkan diplomacy and both are in a strong position at present in such resistance.

The first point is that the two cases are not on all fours, and that Serbia can be dealt with much more easily than Greece. The claim of Serbia to Monastir is so weak ethically and ethnologically that it can be over-riden without prejudicing our moral prestige as protagonists of the smaller nations. Moreover, with her patron, Russia, engaged, her one hereditary enemy, Austria, in one camp and the other, Italy, in the other, the position of Serbia is obviously weak in any event. The entry into war of Italy has made it imperative on Serbia either to consolidate her claim on the Allies by energetic co-operation and entire compliance or else to conserve her forces so as to be able to enter and entrench any territory that may be open to her. It seems likely that she will take the second course, and that not only in regard to Austria and Bosnia Herzegovina but also in regard to Italy and Albania. However that may be, the political position of Serbia is such that she must go on fighting, at least defensively, on the side of the Allies; while the difference to our cause between a Serbian offensive and defensive is not great. If we go deeper than the immediate exigencies we find that the renunciation of Monastir by Serbia is neither ^{an} unjust nor an injudicious sacrifice to require, and that the return of it to Bulgaria is the most indispensable condition to a permanent peace in the Balkans.

The claim of Greece to Kavalla is a very different one. Although, if we go deep enough into the ethics of recent Balkan politics, there may not be much to choose between the two claims, yet the Greeks have managed to secure a far better title in international law and equity. Their title is, like that of the Serbs one of conquest in a campaign for which the Bulgars allowed themselves to be made responsible; but the Greeks committed no direct breach of contract, and their claim ~~is equity~~ ^{geographically} and ethnology ^{ically} is better than that of the Serbs

LYMORE END,

LYMINGTON,

HANTS.

to Monastir. They are moreover, and this is the important point, much more capable of defending their claims. If we tried to force them out of Kavalla we should be putting ourselves in a false position which the Greeks are very capable of making the most of. We should be prosecuted before the Areopagus of Europe by a most astute attorney on a very unpleasant charge. But, more than this, we cannot afford to alienate Greek sympathies in our present strategic position in the Aegean, where we are practically operating in Greek waters. Greece could soon put us into a position comparable to that of Germany and in Belgium; for, though it ^{might} be morally stronger, ^{militarily} it would be much weaker. If we want, like Germany, to turn our enemy's left flank and reach one of his capitals by way of a minor Power, we can only do it by avoiding, unlike Germany, coming into collision with that power. It must be remembered ^{also} that Greek nationalism is the predominant moral force shaping events in the Eastern Mediterranean, and that we can achieve nothing permanent in opposition to it. Nor is Greece bound to take sides with us as is Serbia.

We have so far recognised that Greece cannot ~~be~~ coerced but must be conciliated as to the ~~cession~~ ^{cession} of Kavalla. The offer of the reversion of Smyrna should reasonably have been accepted, and its failure leaves a difficult situation diplomatically speaking. It seems improbable that the Venizelists in view of the outcry against the ~~cession~~ ^{cession} last spring and the recent course of the war will now be able to reopen the diplomatic negotiation on this basis. It is likely that the only chance of coming to terms is to rearrange the offer and the method of ~~proceeding~~ ^{proceeding} so as to recommend it to the Greek democracy.

Democracies, especially Balkan democracies, are suspicious of diplomatic ~~proceedings~~ ^{proceedings} and promises from the Great Powers. It does not seem to them that an arrangement by which they would surrender one conquest to one hereditary enemy on the chance of ^{succeeding to} winning another conquest from the other is as good a bargain as it really is. It would be better to keep this part of the deal in the background and to put forward some immediate smaller ~~promise~~ ^{profit} such as the immediate ~~surrender of Cyprus~~ and abolition of the Dept control. It would also be better to cover the eventual ~~cession~~ ^{cession} of Kavalla by some formula of a democratic rather than of a diplomatic character.

For instance, an undertaking might be given by us that the redelimitation of frontiers after the war should follow the principle of nationality as interpreted by a Body on which allied and neutral States should have equal representation. Such an undertaking does not at first sight contain anything that need alarm Greek nationality ~~or seem to~~ ^{as} seeming to be either bullying or bribing it;

x get not alarm free!

SECRET

NOTHING

out if Greece, ~~and still are Serbia~~, accepts this and accords a revision of the Treaty of Bucharest to such a Body then, whether they be represented on it or not, it enables us to promise Bulgaria Kavalla and ~~Monastir~~ without fear of not being able to make our promise good.

It would be necessary however, for the success of this proposal, that it should not be put forward in Athens, Sofia and Nish through the ordinary diplomatic channels. If this were done, the disguise would at once be penetrated and we should be considered merely as having again gone hat in hand to the Balkan Governments. A special Mission should be sent, headed by a public personage of a character to inspire public confidence in the undertaking in which he would announce on his arrival in Athens. Then, if the diplomatic side of his mission failed, and he was unable to secure the eventual cession of Kavalla on the lines above suggested, he would none the less proceed to the other capitals and return without any appreciable injury to our prestige. If, on the other hand, he succeeded in getting at Athens such an acceptance of this programme as would refer the question of Kavalla to an international Peace Congress, his task at Sofia would be easy; and at Nish the undertaking could be put forward as a pronouncement rather than as a proposal.

Know but later on Seneca + Ingham
settled may be wrong - partitions + spaces
Lib did not ^{think} it was a mistake to try to war

SPEAKERS COURT,
PALACE OF WESTMINSTER.

Propose Buffer states + sea routes.
12 Aug. 1941.
definite guarantees of neutrality
an organization

Cast 1941

It is opportunity

My dear Noel.

I hear that you people are
rallying for the next fight and that
various groups are discussing the
proper plan of Campaign. There
can I assume be no question now
of fighting on the old issue as to
whether we were right in going to war,
we are at war and must make the
best of it - when we are out of war
again it is to be hoped that public
opinion will be disposed to take
steps to prevent a recurrence of
the checkmate by disarming
Spring on ~~the~~ a pacific people a
week ago. But they wouldn't
listen now to any proposal for
strengthening democracy in foreign
affairs. (This the VDC preferred)
It seems to me that the first

fight to win us, is to secure
a good peace. Of this is a war of
Coalition by European civilisation
against German militarism the
danger is lest, like the War of the
Balkan Coalition it lead to Wars
of Partition - Balances of Power - and
fresh Alsace-Lorraine or monaster-
national casus belli. At present it
seems to me an even chance whether
this war leads to a better or a worse
state of affairs than before. It has
not really been engaged in with any
definite purpose still less with any
clear policy for making things
better - and it will not do so unless
such is supplied by the liberals in
the Liberal Party.

It also seems to me that
in order to get the what good there is
out of the solution by war forced on
us it is necessary to use as far

x by pay?

as possible the forces that have
sent us to war. [It might have been
better for the conduct of the Liberal Party
had split over the recourse to war (and
left the responsibility for it to a coalition)
but as it is the party will stand or
fall by the results it can show in the
conduct of the war and the conclusion
of peace. The first seems to be going
all right - it is the second as to which
I am personally and professionally
anxious. (ie men) not Germany still?

[The forces that have sent us
to war ^{is} I suppose the preference of
the ruling class for war and their prejudice
against Germany. The first has its
origin in internal politics the second
in international. This force is quite
incapable of making a satisfactory
settlement after the war and I see
no influence or inspiration or interest
either in Parliament - the Foreign Office
or the Press likely to steer it away
from diplomatic frivolities onto sound
democratic principles] - unless you

group and can do so. But you will
only be able to do so if you can
succeed in doing ^{the same} ~~them~~ ^{forces} ~~some~~
that have made ^{the} ~~the~~ ^{war} ~~war~~ and
guiding them on the lines they have
laid down for themselves into a more
permanent peace than they could
unaided procure.

For instance for an assured
lay men - (with sufficient basis of truth)
that we are fighting against militarism
and on behalf of the rights of the minor
nationalities and the principle of
neutralisation. Very well. Then let
our efforts be directed to seeing that
we get those ^{objects in such form as to be} securities for future peace
without being
we have been muddled and manoeuvred
into war ^{through} having a moral
guarantee ^{as to} of the neutralisation of the
North Sea which no one had clear
knowledge of - and a moral obligation
for the neutralisation of the Low
Countries which no one could calculate
the effect of. If these obligations
had been clear in pacific purport
and in their public sanction were
popular

2
SPEAKERS COURT,

PALACE OF WESTMINSTER.

Men would have been ~~little~~ ^{so much} ~~the less~~ ^{the less} danger of militarist influences at home committing us to diplomatic engagements - defensive in form but aggressive in spirit; and there would have been little danger of militarist influences abroad (counting on their obligations not being observed).

2 We should as a result of this war, in my opinion, try to secure an international guarantee not only of buffer states between all the great Powers but also of the narrow Seas. The gaps between Denmark and Switzerland should be filled with or also neutralized Alsace-Lorraine. The north Sea and the Channel should be neutralized (as the Black Sea once was and the Straits still are) and the principle should be extended as far as the conditions consequent on the war allow.

This will be a far more

practical way of dealing with armaments than suspension of ~~Construction~~ or limitation of ~~Construction~~ which both have ~~exposed~~ ^{are seeing} ~~the~~ same fallacy as the Balance of Power. We have seen how the great difficulty of modern armies is to find a suitable battleground and how modern navies do not venture into the narrow seas at all - so the strategic conditions would aid in getting the principle accepted. We have seen how fear of invasion acts as the main incentive first to armaments and military alliances and thereafter to war itself - and the fear of invasion ~~behind~~ across buffer states under general quarantine must be less - especially after our conspicuous recognition of our obligations under such a quarantine.

To sum up - neutralisation has always seemed to me the best way of dealing with adventurous

diplomacy and growth of armaments
and then seems to be some chance
of getting it - now that we have
gone to war for it.

One mass peril - I
see that the "nation" has not got
beyond praying that the war may
convert Europe from hostile camps
into a united Concert. It may do
so - as did the somewhat analogous
napoleonic war. But the Holy
alliance was the worst influence in
foreign affairs we ever had - worse
far than the napoleonic despotism.
A Concert which had undefined power
authority and no definite policy is
not a thing to pray for. But a
Concert for the definite purposes of
maintaining the neutralisation of
buffer states and boundary waters
would do no harm.

Finally this is a policy
which anyone of either party
could properly adopt and even

publicly profess before peace is
actually in sight. It is only a
development of the cause for which
we are properly fighting - while
it does not raise the question as
to whether we are properly fighting
for it or not.

an organisation to expand the
principles of nationality and of
neutralisation and to prepare for
a peace on the basis of these principles
would not be considered un-patriotic
by the most jingo. And it might
become an effective means of progress
later.

I have been detained here
first by Helen's illness and then by
the war - but expect to be off to
my post soon now. I shall be
here for a week more anyway
if you want a talk.

Yours
{ George Jones.

You can pass this on to anyone
you think it might interest.

Joris.
persisting

12 Holland Street.

W.8.

19/3/44

My dear Nowl

If you couldn't get off on that job I wouldn't go on with it. It wouldn't work with anyone else and, unless it is done now it wouldn't be worth while. The conditions are now suitable, but won't continue so for long. It has now about an even chance of success, and as this would mean emancipating Central and Eastern Europe it is of a different order of importance from anything you can do towards emancipating Germany in the House of Lords. No doubt-

The House of Lords throughout the war
Did nothing in particular
And did it very well. -

But this is something very particular and that only you can do. So, if you want a place in Heaven and History as a peacemaker, send it to the P.M. or Eden saying it was sent to you by someone who wanted to know Ed who took no reprisals if you would go and who doesn't want to be cited. I hope you will add that you will go if wanted by the Government. Dont mention the matter to anyone else. Leave me in or out as you please.

Ever
[Signature]