

BISHOPTHORPE,

YORK.

6th January 1917.

Dear Buxton,

I thank you for the notes which you have sent to me about our attitude towards President Wilson's proposal. You may be assured that I shall give full consideration to all that you have urged.

Yours sincerely,

John E. Buxton

Personal.

BISHOPTHORPE.

YORK.

28th October 1919.

Dear Buxton,

I certainly hope that the Allied Food Commission may be continued to relieve the desperate situation in Vienna; but I must not sign your letter to the press because, first, owing to the number of applications I receive from all sorts and kinds of people to join in such letters I have been obliged to make it a very strict rule that I cannot do so except in matters where I have some personal responsibility or initiative. But, secondly, because I am in communication with the Archbishop of Canterbury at the present time with regard to a much wider appeal for not Vienna only but all the European Countries and Asia Minor and I think it better to concentrate on that wider issue. I hope you will understand my position and note that it is not due to any want of sympathy with your efforts on behalf of Vienna.

Yours sincerely,

Ormsby

Treat. Ebor.

I don't think
I should have
wide knowledge of Europe!
It is a pleasure for me to
to it does rejoice in
to it covers me!
The value of my
agreement with you.

Bishopthorpe,
York.

5 March 1940

My dear Noel Buxton,

I am very grateful to you for the document you sent me on war policy, and extremely honoured by what you say about the line I have taken myself. I confess to feeling rather anxious at the thought that someone with your knowledge of Europe should be concerned to keep in line with anyone so comparatively amateur as myself. But I am immensely happy to think that our minds seem to coincide over so large an area.

I am not quite sure what your notes point to, on one important matter: I have so far held that it would be wrong to enter on negotiations without guarantees in act for the autonomy of the Czechs and Poles. I quite agree that we must not merely reconstitute Poland and Czechoslovakia as they were. I am inclined to think that the Corridor was a mistake, and that the guarantee for Polish access to the sea ought to take another form than that. There are countries without any sea frontier which contrive to flourish; and in a peaceful Europe,

The guarantee
of defect
not of lasting
peace

Ebor

A

possession of a sea-port would not be a condition of prosperity.

A
yes if y mean
guaranty action

But I am wondering whether towards the end you are suggesting that a conference should be called before the guarantees are obtained, on the ground that concessions should be more easily obtained in conference than as a preliminary? I am inclined to urge that all other concessions should be subject of discussion in the conference, but that the autonomy of Poles, Czechs and Slovaks should be a preliminary condition, secured in act and not only in word. And I think that I should ask this of the new government in Germany, quite as much as I should of Hitler, because it would be the evidence that the new government represented a new outlook.

Your notes seem to me most valuable and suggestive, and I am extremely glad to have them.

Yours sincerely,

William Ebor;

Track Track
Ebor - Publ by

Bishophorpe,
York.

⓪
clarifies / word
Cond'n in ⓪

gd! agrees w me re
Cond'n of armistice
trusted by Ht.

15 March 1940

My dear Noel Buxton,

I agree that if Halifax were really satisfied that a pledge given before the peace conference meets would certainly be fulfilled, that would be a sufficient ground for going forward.

of armistice

will public trust it?

I find it hard, myself, to imagine what kind of conditions, other than action, could provide such satisfaction; but I should not want to press that, if Lord Halifax, whose judgment I would readily trust in such a matter, believed that the pledges were really bound to be fulfilled.

Yours sincerely,

William Ebor.

Trait

~~Gov~~

B

March 13th, 1940.

My dear Archbishop,

Many thanks for your kind letter and your comment on my notes on war aims. I wish I deserved your opinion of my knowledge of Europe. But it gives me the greatest pleasure that you value my agreement with you on so many points.

I am greatly interested in what you say as to negotiating without guarantees in act, and I would like to say a word on your question whether I am suggesting that a Conference should be called before the guarantees can be obtained. I think by guarantees you mean acts and, in that case,

X my answer is that I ^{do} suggest feelers

on whether our Government have means of

March 13th, 1940.

behind the public scene, and that when these have satisfied Halifax that concessions are genuinely to follow a Conference, it would be right to grant an armistice and enter a Conference, before Germany evacuates Poland. It would, of course, be more clean cut if the German troops were withdrawn first, and easier for the Government to explain their action to our public. But to wait for such a stark confession of failure on the part of Hitler would mean that the war would have to be carried very much further, (and I feel that) if a stable peace comes to be available without prolonged slaughter, we ought to take advantage of the fact. It all depends on whether our Government have means of

satisfying themselves that the concessions will be made. I should greatly value your opinion as to this. *withness of my view*

I think that even if the Government were of this *opinion* view, they might still be deterred from acting on it by the prevalence of the typical war time view, which is that a war must be won, and that a crushing defeat will produce the lasting peace that we want. Therefore it is urgent to give Chamberlain evidence that he would have support in negotiating.

J
Gbor

March 13th, 1940.

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I think that even if the Government were of this view, they might still be deterred from acting on it by the prevalence of the typical war time view, which is that a war must be won and that a crushing defeat will produce the lasting peace ~~that we want.~~ Therefore it is urgent to give Chamberlain evidence that he would have support in negotiating.

COPY

re Ebor

18, Cowley Street,
London, S.W. 1.

March 19th, 1940.

My dear Culverwell,

I would like to tell you that the Archbishop of York replied to the point raised by my notes regarding a conference before German withdrawal of troops from Poland. That will be the crucial point. The Archbishop said he thought it would be wrong to enter into negotiation without action, that all other concessions should be subject to discussion at a conference, but that the autonomy of Poles, Czechs and Slovaks should be preliminary.

I replied as enclosed, and I should much like to know whether you think my reply is the right one.

Tract
To Ebor

March 13th, 1940.

My dear Archbishop,

Many thanks for your kind letter and your comment on my notes on war aims. I wish I deserved your opinion of my knowledge of Europe. But it gives me the greatest pleasure that you value my agreement with you on so many points.

I am greatly interested in what you say as to negotiating without guarantees in act, and I would like to say a word on your question whether I am suggesting that a Conference should be called before the guarantees can be obtained. I think by guarantees you mean acts and, in that case,

my answer is that I suggest negotiations behind the public scene, and that when these have satisfied Halifax that concessions are genuinely to follow a Conference, it would be right to enter the Conference. It would, of course, be more clean cut if the German troops were withdrawn first, and easier for the Government to explain their action to our public. But to wait for such a stark confession of failure on the part of Hitler would mean that the war would have to be carried very much further, and I feel that if a stable peace comes to be available without prolonged slaughter, we ought to take advantage of the fact. It all depends on whether our Government have means of

unsatisfying themselves that the concessions
will be made.

I should greatly value your opinion as to this. I think that even if the Government were of this view, they might still be deterred from acting on it by the prevalence of the typical war time view, which is that a war must be won and that a crushing defeat will produce the lasting peace that we want.

I had an interesting talk with Bishop Rode of Lund last week. He knows the Germans well. His view is that German feeling will be hostile to war in the future, however the war ends. I feel myself that it is most

desirable that Hitler should not get away
with a successful war, but that a humiliation
would certainly produce another.

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Glor. tract.
action precedent.

Give an argument to show what Ebor refers to as 'conditions' (line at foot)

As from
Bishopthorpe,
York.

March 29. 1940

124 dear Noel Barton,

(6)

A good deal depends on exact balance, so if you quote me to Lord Halifax I hope you will show him this letter.

The requisites for negotiation in my (quite uninformed) judgment are:

(1) restoration of Czech, Polish & Slovak autonomy - & that, not as satellites to Germany

(2) serious prospect of such an organisation of Europe as to give substantial hope that future aggression will be checked from the outset.

I am perfectly ready to trust Lord Halifax's judgment with regard to conditions that might be accepted

as adequately covering these points,
and if he were satisfied, I should
think it right to offer to negotiate
rather than continue - or increase -
the slaughter. But I cannot
myself conceive the combination
of factors, in the world as it is,
which could provide the necessary
assurance -

Yours sincerely

William Ebor.

COPY

Elton

Bishophorpe

York

4 April 1941

My dear Noel Buxton,

You will probably think that I am just falling into the prejudices which did so much harm last time, but it seems to me that this war is quite different from the last in one vital respect: The Government of Germany that time had inherited a good many evil traditions, but it was not formally and publicly committed to vile principles. The present German Government is so committed. I quite recognise that we may be driven, for example if Germany succeeds in seriously stopping our food supply, to make peace with Hitler; but I can't bring myself to begin considering what kind of peace I should be prepared to make with him as things stand now. I have always wanted a statement of principles of peace-making, which might appeal to all that is reasonable in Germany behind Hitler's back, but I have also equally thought that we ought to make clear that we could not voluntarily enter into any negotiations with him or any of his gang.

I do not know how far you agree with this, but the

draft you have sent me seems to imply a quite different view. I think that if Hitler is still in control of Germany after peace is made, his whole history as well as his beliefs would make a renewal of war in a comparatively short time quite inevitable. But I think that our failure to appeal to Germany, so to speak, over his head, has been a really great psychological and political blunder. I suppose it is due to the fact that the Cabinet has never been able to agree what appeal to make.

Yours very sincerely,

(signed) William Ebor.

Ans: Toynbee Henry. Glory

Bishopthorpe,
York.

Copies

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York

April 1941

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