

VOL. II. No. 1.

JANUARY, 1923.

*Fryer*

JOURNAL  
OF THE  
BRITISH INSTITUTE OF  
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

*Good*



## CONTENTS

	PAGE
RECENT REVELATIONS ON EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY. By G. P. Gooch, M.A. . . . .	1
THE STABILITY OF THE EXISTING RÉGIME IN GERMANY— Summary of Address by DR. ALICE SALOMON on November 20th, 1922 .	30
THE BULGARIAN ASPECT OF THE NEAR EAST QUESTION. By LADY GROGAN . . . . .	35
REVIEWS . . . . .	38
NOTES . . . . .	41
CORRESPONDENCE . . . . .	49
FORTHCOMING MEETINGS . . . . .	50

---

*The Institute, as such, is precluded by its rules from expressing an opinion on any aspect of International Affairs. Any opinions expressed in this Journal are, therefore, purely individual.*



JOURNAL  
OF THE  
BRITISH INSTITUTE OF  
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

JANUARY, 1923

RECENT REVELATIONS ON EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY.<sup>1</sup>

*(Paper read on December 12th, 1922.)*

AMONG the results of the war of 1914 has been the opening of the archives of three of the Great Powers. The defeat of Germany, Austria and Russia and the disappearance of their dynasties have created a demand and provided an opportunity to explore the secret recesses of the Chancelleries. But the collapse of the three despotic empires which made the war has done more than break the official seals; for one after the other of the leading actors in the drama has endeavoured to convince the world that the responsibility for the catastrophe does not rest upon his shoulders. The revelations, both documentary and autobiographical, are already of enormous bulk and of surpassing interest.

It is not surprising that laborious Germany should take the lead in the campaign to elucidate the origins of the conflict. When the German Government in the summer of 1919 commissioned General Montgelas and Professor Schücking to publish the documents collated by Kautzky, it had already resolved to reveal the secrets of German diplomacy during the years preceding the catastrophe. But before the editors had proceeded far with their task they realised that it was useless to begin with the Balkan Wars, or the annexation of Bosnia, or the Morocco crisis of 1905, and that the tendencies and forces leading up to the world war could only be explained by tracing the policy of the Great Powers back to the creation of the system of alliances which sprang from the war of 1870 and moulded the fortunes of Europe for

<sup>1</sup> Copies of this paper, in pamphlet form, may be obtained from the Secretary, British Institute of International Affairs, Malet Street, W.C.1, at 1s. 6d. each.



half a century. "In resolving to open its archives," write the editors, "the German Government has taken a step which constitutes a precedent in the history of European policy. To reveal the most secret and confidential documents, which in the ordinary course would slumber till the scholars of a future generation broke the seals, is a resolve so out of the common that it must form an epoch in the history of the methods of government. A government and a people which thus reveals its secrets displays unbounded confidence in the power of truth to reconcile and to heal."

The first six volumes of *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Mächte, 1871-1914*, which were published in the early summer of 1922, carry us from the close of the Franco-German war to the fall of Bismarck, and are dominated by the figure of the mighty Chancellor. The editors have wisely rejected the strictly chronological method, and have grouped their material in such a form that we can follow the course of German policy in regard to the chief problems which it had to face. Thus the first volume is devoted to the relations of Paris and Berlin in the years following the war; the second to the Eastern Question up to the Congress of Berlin; the third to the foundation of the Bismarckian system of alliances; the fourth to the relations of Great Britain to the Triple Alliance; the fifth to the Bulgarian crisis; the sixth to the closing years of Bismarck. Among the most interesting of the thousand despatches are those which illustrate the war scare of 1875, the foundation of the Austro-German Alliance, the Anglo-German colonial friction of 1884, the Franco-German *rapprochement* under Ferry and Freycinet, and the ever-changing relations between Petrograd and Berlin. But the supreme attraction of these volumes is that they enable us to watch the greatest of all diplomatists at work. The editors assure us that they have published everything worth publishing, regardless of whether a document told for or against their country. Assuming this to be true, our belief is confirmed that from 1871 till his fall Bismarck was the pillar of European peace. Not only had he no desire to initiate a conflict, but it was his strong arm alone which prevented Austria and Russia from flying at each other's throats. Since France alone could never reverse the verdict of Sedan, his policy was to keep her in quarantine by understandings with all the other Great Powers. Thus Austria, Italy and Roumania became his allies; when the League of the Three Emperors broke up in 1887, he signed the secret treaty of reinsurance with Alexander III; and after tentative approaches



to Downing Street during the seventies and eighties, he definitely invited Lord Salisbury in 1889 to conclude an alliance. The Prime Minister, like Disraeli before him, would have preferred Berlin to any other partner; but he feared that public opinion was opposed to Continental connections and replied that in these democratic days he could say neither Yes or No, but must let the proposal lie on the table. In the same year, however, as we learn from these pages, Joseph Chamberlain proposed to the German Ambassador the surrender of Heligoland in return for compensation in Africa. The Emperor William I watched the performances of his Chancellor with a mixture of admiration and terror. "I should not like to be in your skin," he remarked; "you are like a Japanese conjuror who keeps tossing five balls into the air and catches them every time." Such a virtuoso appears once in a century or two, and with the dismissal of Bismarck the control of German policy fell into the hands of lesser men, who failed to maintain the isolation of France.

Before the history of German policy under William II can be authoritatively described, the official collection of despatches must be completed. Our knowledge of the reign has nevertheless been notably increased during the past few years. The third volume of Bismarck's *Reflections* is brief, querulous and disappointing. The Kaiser has unconsciously drawn his own portrait in his letters and telegrams to the Tsar, the former of which are best studied in the edition of Professor Walther Goetz, of Leipzig, while the latter are to be found in the little volume published by Bernstein in New York in 1918 under the misleading title of the *Willy-Nicky Correspondence*. While these curious documents as a whole bear the unmistakable impress of their author's histrionic personality, the more important of them were revised and in some cases drafted in the Wilhelmstrasse. "They were never despatched," writes the Kaiser in his Memoirs, "without the knowledge of the Chancellors, and sometimes at their wish." There is no scrap of evidence in them to confirm the popular delusion that the Kaiser was engaged throughout his reign in planning an attack on his neighbours. On the other hand, they strengthen the impression that he was a factor of unrest and unsettlement in the life of the world, and the story of the Pact of Björko, the most sensational of their revelations, leaves a disagreeable taste. The deep distrust of British policy mirrored in these pages, his unmeasured contempt for the French Republic, his morbid horror of democracy, his restlessness, his credulity and his suspicions have convinced many of his late subjects, no



less than more distant observers, that he was temperamentally unfit for rule.

The Kaiser's Memoirs follow the familiar practice of transferring responsibility for the catastrophe to other shoulders. There is no suggestion that he ever made a single mistake, and we are assured that he protested against the worst blunders of his counsellors, which as a constitutional monarch he was unable to prevent. We know from Schön's Memoirs that his master disliked the Tangier demonstration, and he may well have disapproved the Agadir *coup*, the work of Kiderlen-Waechter. It is, however, impossible to believe that he was opposed to the Kruger telegram. The accounts of that famous incident are so conflicting that we cannot distribute the exact share of responsibility; but the Kaiser's letter to the Tsar of January 2, 1896, proves that he was at least as angry and excited as the Foreign Minister, Marschall. He writes with dignity about Bismarck, and with gratitude about Caprivi and Hohenlohe; but his chapters on Bülow and Bethmann-Hollweg are filled with sharp criticism. Bülow, he declares, was a valued friend and an accomplished Parliamentary manager; but his handling of the *Daily Telegraph* crisis destroyed his master's confidence. Bethmann, he adds, was slow in decision and played the schoolmaster. Moreover, his policy of buying back British friendship by a naval agreement was doomed to failure. The Haldane mission is dismissed as a political manoeuvre, and the wisdom no less than the energy of Tirpitz is warmly extolled. The Kaiser stoutly denies that he or his Ministers or his soldiers or his people desired war, and portrays Germany as a profoundly pacific state wantonly attacked by the Triple Entente. His picture is as unconvincing as the rival legend that Germany was the only wolf in the European sheepfold.

The foreign policy of Germany since Bismarck has been authoritatively described from different standpoints by three skilful hands. Count Reventlow's hatred of England—"the Vampire of the Continent"—is known to everybody; but he is a man of outstanding ability, who has gathered information at first hand from Kiderlen-Waechter and other makers of history. The first edition of *Deutschlands Auswärtige Politik*, published in the spring of 1914, was followed in 1916 by a revised and enlarged version, dealing in greater detail with the years immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities. A tenth edition appeared in 1918, and the massive volume is now the familiar companion of students all over the world. The author's explana-



tions of the motives of foreign statesmen, particularly of British statesmen, are often grotesque; but he is never afraid to condemn the performances of his own rulers—above all, their inveterate habit of provocative interventions, followed by humiliating retreats. On Germany's defeat he published a supplementary volume, of inferior value but not without interest, *Politische Vorgeschichte des Grossen Krieges*, in which he sought to discover the operative forces that had led to the cataclysm, and, needless to say, reached the conclusion that Great Britain had been the villain of the piece. He argues that European politics since 1890 are the story of England's struggle, first by diplomacy and then by arms, against a peaceful commercial rival.

When the revised edition of Reventlow's history was issued in 1916 it was fiercely attacked by a young Freiburg Professor, Veit Valentin. "It is a classic example of historiographical demagoguery," he wrote in the *Preussische Jahrbücher*, "and we have no choice but to warn the public against the book and its author." The rebuke created a sensation, for the Professor had recently been commissioned by the Foreign Office to write a history of German foreign policy based on the official papers. The fruits of his labours appeared in 1921, under the title of *Deutschlands Aussenpolitik, 1890-1918*. Since scarcely more than a hundred pages are devoted to the narrative of events before 1914, his work in no way supersedes Reventlow, who halts at the outbreak of war. Its value lies in the comprehensive survey of Germany's relations to the Great Powers on the eve of the catastrophe, and in the penetrating discussion of the events of July, 1914. Valentin has given us the most dispassionate analysis of the problem of responsibility which has yet appeared in Central Europe. He places Russia first among the offenders, Austria second, France, England and Germany third. France, he argues, had for years stimulated Russia's will to war. Sir Edward Grey did his utmost to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, but he was blind to the danger of Russian chauvinism. Germany's error was in imagining that an Austro-Serb conflict could be localised. "None of the Powers," he concludes, "was wholly innocent, none alone guilty. The world spirit was ready for the world war." From this condemnation Belgium is excluded, for he pays a warm tribute to the loyalty with which she discharged her obligations of neutrality.

Of far greater value than Reventlow or Valentin is the series of volumes in which Otto Hammann, for many years head of the Press Department of the Foreign Office, has described German



policy from the fall of Bismarck. No country in Europe possesses so authoritative a record of the actions of its Government. Three volumes of reminiscences (*Der neue Kurs, Zur Vorgeschichte des Grossen Krieges, Um den Kaiser*) bring the story down to the fall of Bülow in 1909; and a supplementary work, published in 1921, entitled *Der missverstandene Bismarck* (Bismarck Misunderstood), summarises the material in the preceding volumes relating to foreign affairs and adds new facts and reflections. A fifth volume, published in 1922, *Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit*, portrays Kiderlen-Waechter and Bethmann-Hollweg and prints important documents, among them the "ultimatum" to Russia in 1909, and the Kaiser's report of the Cronberg conversations in 1908. Among the most valuable features of his five volumes are the story of the British offer of alliance during the Boer War, the searching analysis of Holstein's activities, the affectionate study of Bülow's personality, and the full-length portrait of William II. The latter is perhaps the most impartial and penetrating characterisation of the monarch that we possess. The Kaiser, he complains, never grew up, and never learned from his own mistakes. But his desire for the maintenance of peace was absolutely sincere. He was a stage hero, not a warrior. His real responsibility for the war is to be found in the pretentious and menacing utterances, public and private, which caused the world to believe that he aimed at conquest. "The deepest tragedy of the Peace Kaiser in shining armour is that he will never understand his own share in producing the situation which led to the war."

The Memoirs of Schön, Foreign Secretary from 1907 to 1910 and thenceforward Ambassador at Paris till the outbreak of war, are written in the same spirit of moderation and detachment. The position of Foreign Secretary in Germany has never been one of the coveted posts, involving, as it usually does, responsibility without power. On occasion, as in the case of Bülow under the aged Hohenlohe, and Kiderlen-Waechter under the inexperienced Bethmann-Hollweg, the Minister may make himself felt; but as a rule he is nothing but the understudy of the Chancellor. Schön, indeed, never attempted to be anything else. His term of office, however, synchronised with important events, including the Kaiser's visit to Windsor in 1907, the Bosnian crisis, and the *Daily Telegraph* incident, on all of which he throws fresh light. His verdict on the Kaiser closely resembles that of Hammann. "He was denied the gifts which would have been of most use to him as a ruler, such as a capacity for cool, careful



and prudent reflection. He was a man of great merits but considerable shortcomings. His was not a well-balanced mind. He was inspired by an earnest desire to administer his exalted office faithfully, full of ambitious ideas, and confident that he would be given strength to carry them out. But his restless, eager activity repeatedly came to a standstill, unknown to the general public. He was seized with fits of despondency, and had thoughts of abdicating. In public life the imperious pompous ruler, in the quiet of his home life a human being like others, a good man, whose simplicity and refreshing candour were very attractive. It would be difficult to decide which was most consistent with his true character."

A very different type of autobiography is that in which Tirpitz, the strongest figure in German politics since the fall of Bismarck, describes his efforts to create a German High Seas fleet. He bitterly assails those who stood in his way or those who, like Bethmann-Hollweg, failed to afford him the requisite support. His standpoint, like that of Reventlow, is that Germany required sea-power; that its attainment involved the jealousy and antagonism of Great Britain; that all attempts to recapture British friendship were a waste of effort; and that in consequence friendship with Russia should be maintained or regained. The weakness of his argument is that Russia, if not irrevocably lost, could at any rate only have been reconciled by acceptance of her ambitions in the Near East and as a consequence the virtual dissolution of the Austro-German partnership.

No recent political autobiography contains so many piquant revelations as that of Baron von Eckardstein, who played a prominent part in the social and political life of England at the turn of the century. His Memoirs have been abridged and translated with rare skill by Professor George Young under the title of *Ten Years at the Court of St. James's*. But students of European diplomacy must study the three volumes of the original, which contain correspondence between London and Berlin of the highest value. The story of the attempts of Chamberlain, warmly backed by Lord Lansdowne and the Duke of Devonshire and tepidly approved by Lord Salisbury, to make an alliance with Germany during the South African war, had already been hinted at in the Memoirs of Hayashi, the Japanese Ambassador, and outlined by Hammann in the second volume of his reminiscences; but the details of the negotiations were first revealed by the tall and handsome Guardsman who conducted them during the illness of his chief, Count Hatzfeldt. It is a curious irony that when Bismarck



proposed an alliance he met with no response in Downing Street, and that when we proposed an alliance some years later we met with no response in the Wilhelmstrasse. Our offer was prompted by our isolation, arising from the unchanging hostility of France and Russia and intensified by the world-wide condemnation of the Boer war; and the cause of its repulse was the fear that an alliance with Great Britain would involve Germany in the traditional quarrel between London and Petrograd. The main author of its rejection was the inscrutable Holstein, on whose half-crazy activities Eckardstein throws a flood of light. But Bülow himself was never a whole-hearted convert, believing as he did that Germany's safety was secured by the Triple Alliance and that in regard to the other Powers it was best for her to keep her hands free.

After the fall of Bismarck there were four policies open to the Kaiser and his counsellors. The first was to continue the Bismarckian system of keeping on good terms both with Great Britain and Russia by avoiding any attempt to thwart their dominant ambitions; but such self-denial was scarcely to be expected from the strongest military Power in the world in the age of Imperialism. Secondly it was feasible to push forward economic enterprise and political influence in Turkey, while diminishing the danger of Russian hostility by the maintenance of cordial relations with Great Britain. This was the course favoured by Caprivi and by the Kaiser himself in the early years of his reign. A third possibility was to risk the antagonism of the strongest naval Power by the construction of a large fleet, at the same time disarming Russia by facilitating her policy in the Near East. This is the line of advance which the Kaiser himself, after the first few years of rule, would have preferred; for the passion of his life was to build a fleet, and there are frequent indications in his correspondence and table-talk of a desire to resuscitate the Bismarckian league of the Three Emperors as a bulwark against British or Anglo-Saxon dictation. Yet, despite the Pact of Björko, which was promptly repudiated by the Tsar's advisers, the short-sighted Kaiser never really attempted to disarm the hostility of his Eastern neighbour; for Russia's eyes were set on Constantinople, which Bismarck had been ready to yield but which the Kaiser was resolved to dominate.

A fourth alternative was to antagonise Great Britain and Russia simultaneously by the creation of a mighty battle-fleet and by a forward policy in Turkey; and it is this which was adopted by the Kaiser in 1897 when he summoned Tirpitz and



Bülow to his councils. This course has been defended by the ex-Chancellor himself in his *Imperial Germany*, published shortly before the war and republished with many omissions and additions in 1916. The most brilliant performer on the German stage since Bismarck was also the greatest of blunderers; for the policy which he describes as that of the free hand was in reality the policy of raising up new enemies and of driving Great Britain to insure herself in the Franco-Russian firm. The war has taught him nothing; for in a letter to a Hamburg newspaper, reprinted in Spickernagel's recent biography of the Prince, he maintains that he was right to avoid intimate contact either with Great Britain or Russia and suggests that his successor was responsible for the failure of a policy intrinsically sound.

The unwisdom of the policy pursued by Bülow and his master has been exposed by Johannes Haller, a Tübingen Professor, with a skill and pungency rare in German political literature. His little book, entitled *The Bülow Era*, published in the spring of 1922, is the expansion of a magazine article which appeared as far back as January, 1917, when Germany believed that she would win the war. "Germany," he declares in his preface, "was strong; but the strongest becomes weak when he undertakes a task beyond his strength. Germany pursued a policy which tempted fate. It was known as *Weltpolitik*, and its track lay across the waves." The true cause of British hostility, he adds, was the construction of the German battle-fleet, and nothing else. That elementary truth was repeatedly pointed out by the German Ambassador in London, Count Wolff-Metternich; but the men in Berlin were deaf and blind. "We never wanted war with England," declares Haller, "but we provoked her to fall upon us." Bülow's sin against the German people was that he allowed his country to drift into a danger-zone, regardless of warnings, and that he needlessly incurred the suspicion and enmity of a nation which had no greater desire than to remain a friend. The accusation that Germany desired and planned a war is rejected by Haller as decisively as by the most orthodox of German apologists; and for proof of his contention he points to the entire absence of a fixed policy and of diplomatic preparation for a life-and-death struggle.

Bülow suggested Bethmann-Hollweg as his successor; but he lived to confess his mistake. Bethmann's unsullied character and love of peace are as incontestable as his incapacity for his post. He knew nothing of foreign affairs at the time of his promotion in 1909, and the lack of unified control was increased



by the appointment of an able but impulsive Foreign Secretary. The first volume of his *Reflections*, admirably translated by Professor George Young, is pitched in a minor key. We seem to hear the plaintive accents of Hamlet lamenting that the times were out of joint and that he was called to set them right. Since Russia was irrevocably lost, he explains, the only chance of escape from *Einkreisung*, or hemming-in, was an agreement with England, and his policy was to meet British demands in regard to the fleet in return for a neutrality pact. Neither side, however, proved willing to make the sacrifice needed for a bargain. The Kaiser, with Tirpitz and the Pan-Germans behind him, refused serious naval concessions, and the British Government, closely linked to France and Russia, merely promised not to make or join in an unprovoked attack. The negotiations have been described in Lord Haldane's *Before the War*, in Sir Edward Cook's semi-official pamphlet, *How Great Britain Strove for Peace*, in a White Paper issued in 1915, and in Huldermann's recent life of Ballin. They began in 1909, were interrupted by the Agadir crisis, were resumed by Lord Haldane at Berlin, and broke down after the prolonged discussion which followed his return. Though the British and German Governments co-operated in maintaining the peace during the Balkan wars, and a new confidence, mirrored in the Bagdad Railway and the African agreements, began to prevail, the division of Europe into two camps was in no way modified. Thus when the murder of Francis Ferdinand provided Austria with the desired pretext for a final reckoning with Serbia, Bethmann, like his master, accepted his ally's contention that the termination of Serb intrigues against the integrity of the Dual Monarchy was a matter of life and death. We have as much or as little right to blame Germany for standing by Austria at this moment as to blame France for her unconditional support of Russia. But in that case the Chancellor should have insisted on being consulted at every stage, instead of handing a blank cheque to the hot-headed and incapable Berchtold. This assumption of unlimited liability, combined with the surrender of control, deprives Bethmann, as it deprives his master, of all claim to statesmanship; for when he tried to rein in the runaway Austrian steed he found that it was too late. His pages on the outbreak of war depict a good man struggling with a situation to which he was unequal, and contributing by his blunders to the catastrophe which he was as anxious as any man in Europe to avert. Like the no less pacific Aberdeen in 1854, he drifted into war. He naturally allots the main blame to Russia for declining to



localise the Austro-Serb conflict; but it was his business to know that the struggle could not be localised.

Jagow's work on *The Causes and the Outbreak of the War* covers much of the same ground as that of the Chancellor under whom he served and whose policy he approved. Appointed to succeed Kiderlen-Waechter at the beginning of 1913, the new Foreign Minister entered energetically into the negotiations with Great Britain which followed the failure of the naval and military discussions. On more than one occasion he publicly acknowledged the revival of Anglo-German confidence; but, like Bethmann, he now declares that Sir Edward Grey was too closely enmeshed in the Dual Alliance to be a free agent. "A convinced adherent of the Balance of Power," he writes, "he fell into ever closer dependence on the Entente Powers, and thus, though unconsciously, fostered the aggressive policy of France and Russia." Jagow's growing confidence in Great Britain received a rude shock when he discovered the Anglo-Russian negotiations for a Naval Convention in the early summer of 1914. To Prince Lichnowsky's strictures on the German Government Jagow issued a separate reply in the official *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, which has been reprinted in an American edition of Lichnowsky's Memorandum (International Conciliation, No. 127). Jagow had no more desire for a world war than Bethmann or the Kaiser; but his writings leave the impression that he saw little chance of averting it, since, in his opinion, Austria was bound to ward off the Serbian menace, since chauvinism was in the saddle at Petrograd, and since Great Britain was tied to the chariot-wheels of the Dual Alliance.

The publication of the four volumes of despatches on the outbreak of war, commonly known as the Kautzky documents, emancipate us from the yoke of autobiographies and apologies. The collection must be studied as a whole, not in selected extracts, and, if we approach it without presuppositions, its message becomes perfectly clear. "Germany did not desire the war," declares Professor Sydney Fay, the most impartial of commentators; and I agree with him. The Kaiser's neurotic marginalia are one more proof that he was unfitted for rule; but they do not suggest that he desired to drown the world in blood. His wish was for the prompt and the exemplary punishment of a semi-savage, regicide State by his venerated ally; but on reading Serbia's reply to the ultimatum he exclaimed that all cause for war had disappeared. Yet though he had no desire for war, he had no fear of it. He was well aware that support of Austrian



policy might produce it; and in the days of destiny he took no effective steps to prevent it. The Kautzky volumes, in fact, lead us to substitute one indictment for another. They disprove the legend that the directors of German policy desired a war for the conquest of the world and opposed every attempt to avert it. On the other hand, they prove the Kaiser and his Chancellor to have been short-sighted blunderers, encouraging an ally with criminal levity to a course which was almost certain to lead to a conflagration.

This impression is confirmed by the recently published volume of Bavarian documents (*Bayerische Dokumente*, ed. Dirr), one of which has been the theme of heated controversy. A fortnight after the conclusion of the war, Kurt Eisner published a despatch from the Bavarian Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin to the Premier, Count Hertling, dated July 18, 1914. On the strength of information supplied by the Under-Secretary Zimmermann, the forthcoming ultimatum is outlined, which, it is added, Serbia could not possibly accept. The resolve to seize the favourable moment, even at the risk of war with Russia, was fully approved. Austria, declared Zimmermann, was now the sick man of Europe, and Russians, Italians, Roumanians, Serbs, and Montenegrins were waiting to divide his possessions. Vigorous action against Serbia would restore the vitality of the State. After the assassination of Eisner it was discovered that he had omitted important parts of the long despatch; and we may now read it as it was written, with the author's comments on Eisner's dishonest handiwork, which was designed to suggest that Germany desired a world war, not a localised conflict.

The testimony of the archives has been supplemented by the labours of a committee of the Reichstag, nominated in 1919 to investigate German diplomacy in 1914. Its first task was to ask the leading civil and military officials, bankers and captains of industry, a series of searching questions, to be answered in writing. Every one whom the Kaiser saw at Potsdam on July 5 and 6 was approached, and their evidence agrees that, while the danger of a conflict was mentioned, no special naval or military measures were ordered. War was considered a possibility, not a probability, and no steps to prepare for it were taken before the ultimatum to Serbia. Of no less interest is the report on the military preparations of Russia, largely based on documents found in Warsaw after the Russian withdrawal.

Germany is ahead of all the other belligerents in the number and importance of the publications describing the course of the



conflict. The story has been authoritatively told from the military side by Ludendorff, Hindenburg and Falkenhayn. Ludendorff's Memoirs were the first to be written and the first to be translated, and they have been read all over the world. Though their main theme is military operations, the later chapters contain a good deal of political information; for as the struggle continued Germany's super-man obtained an increasing control over every department of Government. We feel the power of the man, not only in his narrative but in the memoranda republished in his companion work on the General Staff. His sudden conversion in the early autumn of 1918 from confidence in victory to certainty of defeat increased the difficulties of his Government; and the controversy between them is fought out in the official publication on the events leading to the armistice and in his own documented rejoinder.

Hindenburg's book, like its writer, has been overshadowed by the dominating personality of his nominal subordinate. The veteran Field Marshal was no super-man, and is modestly aware of the fact. His unpretentious autobiography contains a good deal of information as to the higher direction of the war, and it is commendably free from recrimination. Even more impersonal is the volume in which Falkenhayn records the activities of the General Staff from the time that he succeeded Moltke after the battle of the Marne till he was himself superseded by Hindenburg and Ludendorff after the failure at Verdun. For the naval history of the war and the relation of the naval chiefs to the Government we must turn to the censorious grumblings which fill the second volume of Tirpitz and to the detailed narrative of Admiral von Scheer, the hero of the battle of Jutland.

We are fortunate in possessing three works which, taken together, authoritatively explain the political conduct of the German Government during the conflict. The main interest of the second volume of Bethmann's *Reflections*, as of his first, is the story of his unsleeping conflict with the military advisers of his master. Before the war the enemy was Tirpitz; and when Falkenhayn, who never meddled in politics, fell in 1916, Bethmann's days were numbered. Ludendorff regarded the Chancellor as unequal to his task and incapable of keeping the home front unbroken. His fall was postponed by his surrender to the demand for the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare; but the respite was brief. When in June, 1917, Erzberger announced his belief, hitherto confined to the Socialists, that the war must end in a compromise, and framed a peace resolution



repudiating annexations, the Generals secured the resignation of the Chancellor by threatening their own. The story is told at length by their victim, who concludes his narrative with the bitter observation that henceforth Germany was governed by the military.

Among the topics discussed by Bethmann is the entrance of the United States into the war; and his brief account should be compared with the detailed narrative of Count Bernstorff. The Ambassador's book, *Three Years in America*, is one of the most poignant produced by the war. He argues that in January, 1917, President Wilson was both willing and able to secure an acceptable peace, and that he was only prevented by the mad resolve to resume unlimited submarine warfare. His belief in the President's sincerity was shared by the Chancellor; but the latter, agreeing in this respect with Ludendorff, failed to detect any signs of readiness for a compromise on the part of the Entente, which had angrily repudiated the Peace Offer of the Central Powers, and had responded to the President's request for a statement of terms by an opulent programme of annexations and partitions. The grounds for the conviction of the President and Colonel House that the Entente was ready to take far less than it asked have never been divulged; and in their absence it is impossible to judge whether the war could have been ended in the spring of 1917.

More detailed and scarcely less authoritative is the narrative of Helfferich, in his two stout volumes on *The World War*. Helfferich had already engaged in high politics by negotiations connected with the Bagdad Railway, the story of which he has told in a short volume on the years before the war. The young Director of the Deutsche Bank became Minister of Finance and Vice-Chancellor, and he loyally supported Bethmann in his struggle against the Generals. No prominent actor on the German war stage except Ludendorff creates a greater impression of ability and resolution. His book, which is of first-rate importance for the economic as well as for the political history of the struggle, is too little known in England.

When Bethmann fell in June, 1917, the Chancellorship was offered to Count Hertling, Prime Minister of Bavaria, and the Nestor of the Catholic party. He refused, and the post was given to an obscure Prussian official. Michaelis required but a short time to demonstrate his incapacity, and when in the autumn Hertling was again invited to shoulder the burden, he could no longer decline. The story of his Chancellorship was told after



his death by his soldier son, who was recalled from the front to serve as his secretary. Brief though it is, the record published under the title of *A Year in the Imperial Chancellery* is of the highest interest, above all for the conflict between the military and the civil authority. We derive the same impression as from the testimonies of Bethmann and Helfferich—the all-devouring activity and brutal strength of Ludendorff, the moderation but also the powerlessness of the Kaiser. When the débâcle of 1918 led to a Parliamentary Cabinet, the tired old Conservative withdrew from his hopeless struggle with foes abroad and at home.

Our knowledge of German policy during the war is supplemented by the *Memoirs of Erzberger (Erlebnisse im Weltkriege)*, the leading spirit of the Catholic party. The South German schoolmaster had made himself a force before the war, and during the struggle he became the most influential member of the Reichstag. His aid was sought by the Government in its efforts to keep Italy out of the war; and the pages in which he describes the unavailing struggles of Prince Bülow and himself in Rome are a real contribution to history. Of no less importance is the record of his activities in carrying the Reichstag resolution of June, 1917. At the opening of the conflict he had shouted with the annexationists; but he quickly changed his course and became the most eloquent champion of a compromise peace. When Germany was confronted with defeat he became Minister of Finance, headed the Armistice delegation, and with infinite difficulty secured a majority in the National Assembly at Weimar for the acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles.

Scheidemann speaks for the Socialists as Erzberger for the Catholics; but the two books differ as widely as their authors. On the eve of war the Socialist leader was on holiday in South Germany, and, in anticipation of great events, he bought a large diary. When all was over he published selections from his entries under the title of *The Collapse (Der Zusammenbruch)*. While other writers work up their material and dramatise their activities, Scheidemann photographs the scene as it moves. Though never officially employed, he was in close touch with the Government, and some of his pictures, such as those of the Stockholm Conference and the Chancellor crisis of 1917, rank as original authorities. From the commencement Scheidemann envisaged the conflict as a war of defence, in which even victory should not justify annexations; but his prosaic temperament and limited ability render him a recorder of events rather than a maker of history.

Next to Germany, Austria has been the chief contributor



to the revelations which enable us to write or rewrite recent European history. When the realm of the Hapsburgs had ceased to exist Professor Pribram obtained leave from the Government of the Austrian Republic to publish the Secret Treaties concluded by Francis Joseph since the creation of the Austro-German Alliance in 1879. Among the jealously guarded treasures now exhibited to the public gaze are the five treaties of the Triple Alliance; the League of the Three Emperors concluded in 1881 and renewed in 1884; Bismarck's Reinsurance Treaty with Russia in 1887, which was hidden from Francis Joseph at the wish of the Tsar; the Austro-Serb Alliance of 1881; the alliance of Roumania with the Central Powers in 1883; the two Mediterranean agreements between Great Britain, Italy and Austria in 1887, and the Austro-Russian agreement relating to the Balkans in 1897. The value of his work, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary*, is enhanced by a masterly record of the negotiations preceding the conclusion of the Triple Alliance in 1882 and its successive renewals and modifications, based on the official material in the Vienna archives. A translation has been published by the Harvard University Press under the skilled supervision of Professor Coolidge.

With the substitution of Aehrenthal for Goluchowski in 1906, Austrian foreign policy entered on a period of activity and enterprise unknown since the days of Andrassy. The achievements of his six years at the Ballplatz may be studied in an admirable monograph by Molden (*Graf Aehrenthal*), and in the second volume of Friedjung's *Era of Imperialism*. The greatest of recent Austrian historians was not conspicuous for balanced judgment. But he was for some years a friend of Aehrenthal, and his chapters on the Bosnian crisis, using unpublished documents of the greatest importance, offer the most authoritative account of a vital chapter of European diplomacy. The true story, it need hardly be said, is very different from that which was current in England at the time and is still widely believed; for the annexation was secretly arranged with Izvolsky, who claimed in return the opening of the Straits to Russian warships.

Sir Edward Grey regarded Aehrenthal as the stormy petrel of European politics; but to Conrad von Hötzendorff, who was appointed Chief of the Staff in the same year that the new Foreign Minister was installed, he appeared as an incorrigible pacifist. Conrad was discovered and promoted by the Archduke Francis Ferdinand; and from the moment that he assumed office he bombarded the Foreign Office and the Crown with exhortations



to go to war. Austria, he argued, was surrounded by enemies, who would one day combine to destroy her; and her only chance of escape lay in dealing with them one by one. Among these enemies was Italy, whose deep-rooted hostility had impressed him during a long residence in Trieste; and he advised an attack on the potentially disloyal ally in 1907 before she could join in a hostile coalition. The proposal to fall upon an ally in time of peace was naturally scouted by Aehrenthal and the Emperor; and when a blow at Serbia during the Bosnian crisis was repeatedly urged by the Chief of the Staff, Francis Joseph again supported his Foreign Minister in declining to break the peace. So indignant was Conrad at Aehrenthal's refusal to seize the opportunities presented to him that he broke off personal relations. He is now engaged in justifying his foresight in a voluminous autobiography (*Aus meiner Dienstzeit*), the first instalment of which extends to 1909 and the second to 1912. Since he was constantly interfering in high politics, and since he reprints his correspondence with Aehrenthal, Francis Joseph and Count Moltke, his book ranks high among the contributions to our knowledge of Austrian policy.

Francis Joseph adopted the advice of the dying Aehrenthal to appoint as his successor Count Berchtold, the Ambassador at Petrograd; and Berchtold, though rightly convinced of his unfitness for the post, accepted the burden. Soon after his appointment the Balkan war broke out, and the inexperienced Minister was called on to deal with a first-class European crisis. Conrad, as usual, besieged the Ballplatz with passionate entreaties to plunge into the fray, while the peace party warned him of the complications that would arise. A vivid picture of the confusion which reigned in the Foreign Office during the twelve months of the crisis is painted in the lively Memoirs of Count Szilassy (*Der Untergang der Donaumonarchie*), who, after filling various diplomatic posts abroad, was now installed at the Ballplatz, where he diligently laboured to counterwork the party of war.

The crisis of 1914 found Berchtold no longer new to his task or distracted by uncertainty, but as fully resolved as Conrad himself to punish Serbia for her intrigues against the integrity of the Hapsburg dominions. The Austrian Red-book published in 1919, of which Allen and Unwin have published a translation in three volumes, enables us to reconstruct the diplomacy of Vienna as fully as the Kautzky volumes reveal the activities of Berlin. Berchtold appears determined on war with Serbia, even at the cost of a world-wide conflagration; and the protocols



of the Crown Councils which decided on the ultimatum show that his views were shared by all his colleagues except Tisza, who, however, eventually withdrew his opposition. The acceptance of the ultimatum was neither expected nor desired at Vienna, which already possessed experience of the value of Serbian promises, and where it was believed that a tactical surrender would merely postpone the inevitable Russo-Serb attack. Not less significant than the Crown Councils held before the despatch of the ultimatum is that held after the declaration of war against Serbia, when Bethmann joined Sir Edward Grey in urging Vienna to moderation. It was now agreed to avoid a direct refusal, but to add that, while the Austrian advance into Serbia must continue, the mobilisation of Russia must cease. Thus the readiness of Austria for an eleventh-hour compromise, of which we heard so much at the beginning of the war, proves to be a legend. It is in vain that Berchtold, in answer to questions by an American journalist, endeavoured to diminish his responsibility by the excuse that Berlin demanded vigorous action.

A vivid picture of Vienna on the eve of war has been painted by Alfred Dumaine, in *La Dernière Ambassade de France en Autriche*. Appointed in 1912, the Ambassador had two years to observe the scene on which the Emperor, the Heir Apparent and the Foreign Minister were the principal actors. Francis Joseph, he tells us, was in full possession of his bodily and mental powers, and took no pains to conceal his dislike of his nephew, whose accession to the throne was, indeed, generally dreaded. Berchtold, we are informed, was an aristocrat of perfect manners, without any vocation for politics. Ignorant, bored by his work, and incapable of decision, he was a tool in the hands of stronger men, among them Count Forgach, the arch enemy of the Serbs. The villain of the piece, in the eyes of the French Ambassador, was Tschirschky, of whose overbearing manners and passionate Serbophobia he writes with detestation.

We are fairly well supplied with first-hand information as to Austria's share in the war. An excellent bird's-eye view is presented in the work of General Cramon, the representative of the German General Staff, entitled *Our Austrian Ally*, of which a French translation has appeared. The three main actors in the drama are Francis Joseph, the Emperor Karl, and Conrad; and we become conscious of an atmospheric change, a cooling of Austro-German sympathy, when the young Emperor succeeds the old. For Conrad's own story we must wait for the third volume of his Memoirs. Meanwhile, we learn how the great struggle



appeared to him from Nowak's book, *The Road to Ruin*, based on material supplied by the Chief of the Staff and certified by him as a correct account of events. In the second volume, entitled *The Collapse of the Central Powers*, Nowak continues his narrative from the dismissal of Conrad to the end of the war. On the quarrels and intrigues which weakened Austria's sword additional light is thrown by General Auffenberg's autobiography.

Passing from the soldiers to the statesmen, we begin with Czernin, whose despatches from Bucharest describe the diplomacy of Roumania before her entry into the struggle. The ex-Foreign Secretary modestly describes his book, *In the World War*, as "snapshots" of the great drama; but he gives us much more than snapshots. His studies of Franz Ferdinand and Tisza are full of life and colour; and his conception of the Kaiser as a well-meaning blunderer, ruined by the Byzantinism of Imperial Germany, is, I believe, not far from the truth. The description of his efforts to persuade Germany to sacrifice Alsace-Lorraine, lest worse should befall, and of his share in the peace of Brest-Litovsk, is of the highest interest. The thoughtful and cultivated Czernin stands out from among the crowd of mediocrities who flit across the European stage during the great war; but he lacked the gift of winning the confidence of those with whom he worked, and Karl parted from him with unconcealed relief.

The most sensational diplomatic revelation during the war was that of the negotiations between the Emperor Karl and the Entente. The first task of the young ruler on his accession was to get in touch with his brother-in-law, Prince Sixte of Bourbon, who was fighting in the Belgian ranks. Of the Prince's journeys to Austria, of his conversations with Poincaré and Ribot in Paris, his visit to Downing Street and Buckingham Palace, Karl's letter recognising the just claims of France to Alsace-Lorraine, his refusal to make substantial sacrifices to Italy, and the consequent failure of the negotiations, we may read in the interesting work entitled *The Austrian Peace Offer*, written in French by Manteyer, from materials supplied by the Prince. When Clemenceau published Karl's letter Germany angrily accused her ally of treachery; but Bethmann was informed of the negotiations, though not of the name of the negotiator, and the German Government was urged to terminate the war by surrendering Alsace-Lorraine, finding territorial compensation at the expense of Russia.

The Hungarian side of the story is far less known than that of Austria proper; but some light is thrown on it by Count



Julius Andrassy's *Diplomacy and the War*. Like all other Austro-Hungarian statesmen, he traces the war to Russo-Serb intrigues against the integrity of the Dual Monarchy. On the other hand, he is an unsparing critic of the policy of Germany, who, he maintains, ought to have chosen between Tirpitz and Bagdad; and he sharply condemns the attack on Belgium. In October, 1918, when the German retreat and the surrender of Bulgaria announced the approaching doom of the Central Empires, he succeeded Burian at the Ballplatz. But the situation was past recall, and the new Minister held for a month the high office which his father had adorned for eight years. In his sober pages, and in the more vivacious Memoirs of Prince Windischgrätz, who was also summoned by the distracted ruler at the eleventh hour, future historians will long continue to study the dying convulsions of a mighty empire.

Though the history of modern Russian diplomacy has never been written, materials for such a work are rapidly accumulating. Witte died in 1915; but his Memoirs could not be published till Nicholas II had ceased to reign. The interest of the book was in large measure forestalled by the appearance of Dr. Dillon's *Eclipse of Russia*, which was based on the Count's confidences and which supplied the first detailed account of the Treaty of Björko. Witte's autobiography is disappointing; for his memory plays him strange tricks, and his monotonous depreciation of the men with whom he worked leaves a disagreeable impression of his powerful but uncouth personality. He despised the Tsar, and the Tsar detested the greatest of his Ministers. Alone of Russian statesmen, Witte had the insight to realise and the courage to proclaim that Russia was too rotten to wage war either with Japan or with the Central Powers.

Very different are the Memoirs of Izvolsky, a man of scholarly and artistic tastes who had seen service in several of the capitals of the world. It was unfortunate that he died after finishing the first volume, which only brings the narrative to his appointment as Foreign Minister in 1906. Fragment as it is, however, it paints interesting pictures of Russia during the Japanese war, including the Dogger Bank incident, the Treaty of Björko, the creation of the Duma, and the rise of Stolypin, the friend and brother-in-law of the author.

Baron Rosen's recently published *Forty Years of Diplomacy* will always rank high among the authorities for the collapse of the Russian Empire. A statesman of the school of Witte, he represented his country at Tokio, whence he sent home reiterated



but unheeded warnings as to the inevitable result of thwarting Japanese ambitions in Korea. A more overwhelming indictment of the crazy diplomacy of the Tsardom has never been written. Of the policy of Izvolsky and Sazonoff, which sought compensation in the Near East for humiliation in Further Asia, he has no better opinion. Russia, he argues, was unfit for war, and should have kept aloof from the quarrels of the Powers. Her initial mistake in tying herself to France and thereby needlessly antagonising Germany was followed by an endeavour to secure hegemony in the Balkans, which involved the hostility of Austria. Such a policy, he declares, led straight to war. His contempt for Sazonoff is unbounded, and he saddles him and Sukhomlinoff with the crime of deciding on general mobilisation, which, as he frankly confesses, involved war. From the outbreak of the struggle he foretold revolution, and did his utmost to convert the Tsar and his Ministers to the idea of a general peace before it was too late. It is a work of poignant sadness, profound insight, and rare independence of thought.

By far the most valuable contribution to our knowledge of European diplomacy in the last years of peace is the massive volume of despatches published at Berlin, in 1921, by Siebert, some time Secretary to the Russian Embassy in London (*Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Ententepolitik*). The text is in German, but the editor declares that the originals can be produced if its accuracy is challenged. He does not explain where and when he procured the documents. Professor Valentin informs us that copies of all the important despatches which passed between London and Petrograd between 1908 and 1914 were forwarded to Berlin, where they were translated by Professor Schiemann; and, though he does not say from whom they came, a certain name is freely mentioned. It is of no importance who betrayed the secrets of Russian diplomacy, for the authority of the documents is beyond doubt. The work opens with the Bosnian crisis, passes on to the creation of the Balkan alliance of 1912, deals at length with Anglo-Russian co-operation in Persia, throws a flood of light on the prolonged negotiations relating to the Bagdad railway, reveals Russia's *rapprochement* with Italy after the Bosnian crisis, emphasises afresh the tension of the Balkan wars, records the neurotic excitement created at Petrograd by the mission of Liman von Sanders to Constantinople, and traces the discussions of 1914 in regard to a secret Anglo-Russian Naval Convention. The volume is as indispensable for the study of British as for that of



Russian policy, for Benckendorff's despatches report innumerable conversations with Sir Edward Grey and the Downing Street officials. Though no very sensational disclosures are made, the volume presents a depressing picture of the anxieties and the jealousies, the suspicions and the ambitions of the Great Powers.

A valuable supplement to Siebert has appeared in 1922, under the ominous title *Un Livre Noir*, which contains the telegrams and despatches of Izvolsky from Paris, whither he was sent at the end of 1910, on ceasing to be Foreign Minister. In this case there is no mystery, for the Soviet Government placed the State archives at the disposal of the editor and translator, René Marchand. The first volume covers 1911 and 1912, the years of Agadir and the first Balkan war. As a professional diplomatist Izvolsky looks down on the ignorance and incompetence of the French Foreign Ministers, Cruppi and de Selves, with whom he had to deal; and his opinion of the French Press is indicated by his demands for a bribery fund, following, as he explains, the successful operations of Austria in the same field.

In addition to permitting the publication of diplomatic correspondence, the Bolshevists have themselves published a number of tit-bits with the object of discrediting capitalist diplomacy. The most important of them were the Secret Treaties concluded during the war, which may be read in the little volume of Mr. Seymour Cocks. But many of the Bolshevist revelations relate to the years before the war. The most sensational is the protocol of the Russian Crown Council of February 8, 1914, in which comprehensive preparations for the seizure of the Straits during a world war were discussed and approved. This and fifty other documents have been translated into French in a volume edited by Emile Laloy (*Les Documents Secrets publiés par les Bolcheviks*). Further light is shown on the vital problem of Russo-Serb ambitions in the Near East in a work by Bogitshevich, formerly Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin (*Causes of the War*), and in the *Diplomatic Reminiscences* of Nekludoff, Russian Minister at Sofia during the Balkan wars. The Russo-Serb menace is depicted from the German point of view in the White-book on Responsibility presented to the Peace Conference at Versailles.

Our knowledge of Russian policy in the critical days of 1914 has been largely increased since the outbreak of the war. The damaging revelations at the trial of Sukhomlinoff are familiar to us all. A recent brochure, entitled *The Falsifications of the Russian Orange-book*, establishes the fact that the official publica-



tion was disfigured by numerous omissions and alterations, and prints the original and the published version of the despatches between Paris and Petrograd in red and black ink. The object of the suppressions was to remove every passage suggesting a tendency to compromise on the part of the Central Powers or an absence of such tendency on the part of Russia. The publication of the documents in their original form confirms the impression that France, though not desirous of war, made no attempt whatever to hold back her ally.

We are fortunate in possessing the testimony both of the German and the French Ambassador in Petrograd in the days of decision. The diary of Pourtalès from July 24 to August 1 (*Am Scheidewege Zwischen Krieg und Frieden*) portrays Sazonoff and the Tsar as men personally inclined to peace but swept along by the irresistible current of chauvinism. The other side of the picture is presented in the opening chapters of Paléologue's diary, three volumes of which have been published under the title *La Russie des Tsars pendant la Grande Guerre*. Of the many books describing Russia during the war none can compare in literary skill with that of the scholarly Frenchman, who not only records his experiences and conversations but makes us feel the moral instability which rendered our ally a broken reed. The Tsar appears throughout as the kindest of men, whose loyalty to his allies and will to victory never wavered for a moment. The Empress, we are assured, was equally hostile to Germany, and there is no foundation for the charge that she intrigued with the Central Powers. She was, nevertheless, the evil genius of her impressionable husband. When Sazonoff, of whom the Ambassador always speaks with admiring affection, was dismissed in 1916, he sadly observed, "The Emperor reigns, but the Empress governs—under the inspiration of Rasputin." The unwavering loyalty of the Tsar and the Tsarina to their allies is confirmed by the diary of General Hanbury-Williams, the British representative at Russian Headquarters (*The Emperor Nicholas II as I knew Him*), and by the pathetic English letters of the Tsarina to her husband, which have recently appeared in Berlin.

In leaving the three despotic Empires for the other belligerents we pass from plenty to dearth. Turkey's military share in the war has been authoritatively described by Liman von Sanders in his *Five Years in Turkey* and Djemal Pasha's *Memories of a Turkish Statesman*. The most interesting of the latter's revelations is that as early as August 2, 1914, Turkey signed a treaty with the Central Powers pledging herself to intervene on their



side. Thus the negotiations with the Entente which are described in Sir Louis Mallet's despatches and in the second Russian Orange-book were nothing but an elaborate farce, in which the Grand Vizier's peaceful assurances were designed to cover leisurely preparations for attack.

It is perhaps natural that the contribution of the victorious Powers to our knowledge of the war and its causes should be small; for failure and defeat are the chief stimulants to authorship. Italy has nothing to show except Giolitti's autobiography, which throws light on the policy of the Powers during the Tripoli war, and on the crisis of May, 1915. It is curious that the French, who have devoted so much attention to the history of their foreign relations, have done little to elucidate the foreign policy of the Third Republic. Hanotaux ends his narrative with the death of Gambetta, and Freycinet concludes his fascinating memoirs in 1893. From that time onwards we have to be content with fragments—Hanotaux' sketch of Fashoda, Mévil's inspired apologia for Delcassé, and Caillaux' spirited defence of his action in the crisis of Agadir. Of the innumerable French books on the origins of the war, two alone increase the sum of knowledge. The co-operative work of Bourgeois and Pagès, *Origines et Responsabilités de la Grande Guerre*, describes the successive phases of Franco-German relations since 1871, with the aid of the archives, but omits the other aspects of French policy. Briefer and more popular in treatment is Poincaré's *Origins of the War*, a reprint of six addresses delivered in 1921. The first three offer a bird's-eye view of French policy from 1871 to the eve of the war, in which the pages allotted to the Balkan war of 1912, when the author was Premier and Foreign Secretary, are the most valuable. The second half of the volume deals with events from the murder of Francis Ferdinand to the outbreak of war, and is one of the most important of our authorities. By a refinement of duplicity Berchtold launched his ultimatum to Serbia directly Poincaré and Viviani had concluded their official visit to Petrograd; and the President's picture of their long voyage home, with the wireless messages pouring in on them and anxiety increasing every hour, lingers in our memory. If it is impossible to concede his claim that for many years France had done everything possible to avert the cataclysm, there is no foundation for the widely held belief that the President desired war. He was certainly not afraid of it, and he was as ready to fight for Russia's vital interests as was Germany for those of her ally. But it is impossible to read his narrative of the crowded days and nights following his return to



Paris, on July 29, without feeling that he dreaded the catastrophe as much as Sir Edward Grey and Bethmann-Hollweg. The French Government has to its credit since 1918 three important documentary publications, dealing respectively with the Russian alliance, the *rapprochement* with Italy in 1902, and the Balkan wars.

British statesmen, with a single important exception, have also maintained silence. Lord Haldane's narrative of the Kaiser's visit to Windsor in 1907, of his journey to Berlin in 1912, and of our military preparations is of the greatest value. Lord Loreburn's book contains no diplomatic revelations. Lord Fisher's *Memories* require to be used with the utmost caution, though unfortunately there is no reason to doubt his statement that he wished to "Copenhagen" the German fleet. For the activities and atmosphere of Downing Street during the war we turn to the vivacious letters in Hendrick's *Life of Walter Page*, which President Wilson described as the best he had ever read.

My survey must conclude with a brief reference to Belgium. In addition to the records of conversations between British and Belgian officers in 1906 and 1912 found by the Germans on entering Brussels, a selection from the despatches of the Belgian Ministers in London, Paris and Berlin was printed by the German Government in 1915 (*Belgische Aktenstücke*, 1905-1914). The publication was purely for purposes of propaganda, the editor selecting despatches which testified to the pacific character of German policy and to the chauvinism of the Entente. This selection was supplemented after the war by four volumes of diplomatic circular letters issued by the Foreign Office at Brussels to its representatives abroad and summarising the information received from various capitals (*Zur Europäischen Politik*, 1897-1914). The work was undertaken by Schwertfeger, as chief editor, at the order of the German Government. Only those documents are selected which refer to the position of Germany, and the introductions are highly controversial; but there is no need to doubt the accuracy of the text, and the historian is glad to possess such a mass of reports and impressions from all parts of Europe from 1897, when the practice of compiling the circulars began, to 1914. A fifth volume contains despatches of the years 1886-1893 relating to the conclusion of the Franco-Russian Alliance. The sharp criticism of the Triple Entente, in which some of the Ministers, and particularly Baron Greindl in Berlin, indulge, was acclaimed in the Central Empires as proof positive of the evil designs of their enemies; but it may equally well serve



to dispel the belief that Belgium had been previously involved in the political system of her future partners. No scrap of evidence has appeared to suggest that Belgium was ever in thought or deed disloyal to her obligations as a neutral.

Though the conduct of each of the belligerents appeared to its enemies to indicate a double dose of original sin, it was nevertheless in every case what might have been expected. It was natural that Serbia should aspire to unite under her sceptre the Yugoslav subjects of her neighbour, should use their undoubted grievances in Croatia to foster the Pan-Serb idea, and should look to Russia for assistance, as Cavour in similar circumstances had looked to France. It was equally natural that Austria should defend herself against the openly proclaimed ambition to rob her of provinces which she had held for centuries. After the Bosnian crisis Serbia had promised to be a good neighbour; but she had not kept her word, and her intrigues with Russia were notorious. To stand with folded arms and wait till her enemies felt strong enough to carry out their programme of dismemberment was to invite disaster; and the murder of Francis Ferdinand by Yugoslav assassins appeared to demand some striking vindication of the authority of the State. The ultimatum to Serbia was a gambler's throw; but to the statesmen of Vienna and Budapest it appeared to offer the best chance of escape from a danger which was certain to increase and which threatened the existence of Austria as a Great Power.

The conduct of Germany was no less short-sighted and no less intelligible. Austria had set her heart on abating the Serbian nuisance; and Austria was the only Power, large or small, on whom Germany could rely, since Italy and Roumania were allies in nothing but name. If Austria ceased to be a Great Power through the loss of her southern provinces, Germany would stand alone in Europe, wedged in between a hostile Russia and a France bent on revenge. In the Bulgarian crisis Bismarck had bluntly told his ally that he would not fight for her Balkan ambitions; but the wire to Petrograd was at that time still working, and Bismarck possessed the friendship of England, which his successors had lost. The Kaiser's appearance in shining armour at the side of Francis Joseph in 1908-9 had compelled Russia and Serbia to keep the peace, and it was hoped that a fresh demonstration of Austro-German solidarity might produce a similar result. If it did not, the Central Powers felt themselves strong enough to defeat the Dual Alliance; for they knew that the Russian colossus had feet of clay, and recent revelations in Paris suggested



that France was ill-prepared for a struggle of life and death. There was, indeed, a risk that Great Britain might throw her sword into the scales; but Anglo-German relations had so greatly improved since the settlement of the Morocco problem that it seemed probable that her neutrality might be secured. Thus when Francis Joseph asked whether he could rely on the support of his ally, the Kaiser and his Chancellor replied that he could. Neither of them desired a world-war; but they were ready for it if Russia declined to permit the localisation of the Austro-Serb conflict. A struggle between the Teuton and the Slav was considered almost inevitable; and the General Staff preferred 1914 to a later date, when Russia's strategic railways on the Polish frontier would be complete and the Three Years Service system in France would be in operation. The Navy had not reached its full stature, but the deepening of the Kiel Canal was completed.

Russia's defeat by Japan had thrown her back on Europe; and it was obvious that as soon as she recovered her breath she would once more pursue her historic ambition to dominate the Near East. Her inability to take up the challenge in 1909 was a bitter memory, and no one had a right to expect that she would submit to such a humiliation again. By 1914 she had regained her self-confidence and was prepared to meet a challenge from any quarter. As Berchtold saw the hand of Russia in the tragedy of Serajevo, so Sazonoff felt the ultimatum of July 23 as a blow struck at Nicholas II not less than at Peter Karagevitch. Had she left her protégé to the tender mercies of Austria, she would have forfeited all claim to be the champion of the Slavonic races and have handed over the Balkan peninsula and Turkey without a struggle to the domination of the Central Powers. Russia could no more be expected to remain neutral in face of an Austrian attack on Serbia than England in face of a German attack on Belgium. The same instinctive pride of a Great Power which compelled Vienna to throw down the glove compelled Petrograd to take it up. Moreover the support of Great Britain in a world-war was taken for granted.

The main cause of the conflict lay in the Near East, and its authors were Germany and Austria on the one side, Russia and Serbia on the other. "I shall not see the world-war," observed Bismarck to Ballin in 1891, "but you will, and it will start in the East"; and his prophecy has come true. But for a quarter of a century the destinies of France had been linked with those of Russia, and, when the long-expected crisis arrived, she took her place at the side of her partner with as little hesitation as Germany



at the side of Austria. She had no desire for war, and took no step to precipitate it. But she had never abandoned the hope of recovering the Rhine provinces, and for that reason could not be included among the "satiated Powers" who at any given moment are the most effective champions of peace. The catastrophe feared, if not foreseen, by Jaurès had come to pass, and France was dragged into a desperate conflict by the ambitions of her ally. To have declined the summons would have constituted disloyalty to her treaty obligations, increased the contempt for "a decadent Power" which was entertained in certain German circles, and have left her defenceless against the victorious Teuton.

It was as natural for Italy to stand out of the conflict as for the five other Great Powers of Europe to take part. As far back as 1896 she had informed her allies that she could not fight on their side if Great Britain as well as France was among their enemies. In 1902 she had pledged herself by treaty to take no share in an attack on France. In 1909 she had promised support for Russian ambitions in return for Russian support of her own. Thus in 1914 she was connected by treaties or understandings with every member of the Triple Entente. On the other hand, though her relations with Germany were excellent, the undiminished longing for *Italia Irredenta* could only be gratified, and the mastery of the Adriatic could only be secured, at Austria's expense. There had never been any real identity of interest between the two Powers, and since her *rapprochement* with France Italy had only been a sleeping partner in the Triple Alliance. Austria was well aware of the sentiments of her southern ally, and she counted so little on her support that she neither communicated her designs nor asked for assistance till the Rubicon was crossed. No Italian statesman could have persuaded his countrymen to take up arms on behalf of Austrian ambitions in the Balkans.

The course taken by Great Britain was marked out for her with equal clearness. "My God, Mr. Page, what else could we do?" cried the King. The violation of Belgian neutrality roused the country to righteous anger; but it was the occasion rather than the cause of our entry into the war. For better or worse we had departed from our traditional policy of "splendid isolation" and become entangled in the quarrels and ambitions of our friends. Had we stood aside at Armageddon the Central Powers would have won an easy victory, and at the conclusion of the contest we should have found ourselves alone in Europe. France and Russia would have scorned us as false friends who, after years of diplomatic co-operation, expert discussions and resonant



protestations of solidarity, deserted them in the crisis of their fate; and the German menace, intensified by the collapse of the Triple Entente, would have compelled us to arm to the teeth on sea and land. Sir Edward Grey's assurance on August 3, 1914, that our hands were free was correct in form but inaccurate in substance; and his whole speech breathed the conviction that we should be disgraced if we left France in the lurch. Mr. Lloyd George was later to describe the relationship as an obligation of honour; and such, I think, is likely to be the verdict of history.

To explain the conduct of the different statesmen of Europe in July and August, 1914, is not necessarily to approve the policy pursued by them and their predecessors, out of which the crisis arose. The root of the evil lay in the division of Europe into two armed camps, which dated from 1871; and the conflict was the offspring of fear no less than of ambition. The Old World had degenerated into a powder-magazine, in which the dropping of a lighted match, whether by accident or design, was almost certain to produce a gigantic conflagration. No war, strictly speaking, is inevitable; but in a storehouse of high explosives it required rulers of exceptional foresight and self-control in every country to avoid a catastrophe. It is a mistake to imagine that the war took Europe unawares, for statesmen and soldiers alike had been expecting and preparing for it for many years. It is also a mistake to attribute exceptional wickedness to the Governments who, in the words of Mr. Lloyd George, stumbled and staggered into war. Blind to danger and deaf to advice as were the statesmen of the three despotic Empires, not one of them, when it came to the point, desired to set the world alight. But though they may be acquitted of the supreme offence of deliberately starting the avalanche, they must bear the reproach of having chosen the paths which led straight to the abyss. The outbreak of the Great War is the condemnation not only of the performers who strutted for a brief hour across the stage, but of the international anarchy which they inherited and which they did nothing to abate.

The causes of the greatest catastrophe in recorded history will continue to be discussed long after its authors, its witnesses and its victims have passed away. It is the duty of all States and all statesmen who took a leading part in the colossal drama to add their testimony to the accumulating material, on which the historian, in calmer times, will erect his enduring edifice of justice and truth.

G. P. GOOCH.



## THE STABILITY OF THE EXISTING RÉGIME IN GERMANY.<sup>1</sup>

(Summarised Report of a Paper read on November 20th, 1922.)

THE subject which your Committee has assigned to me to-night is one the adequate treatment of which would call for the combined gifts of the prophet and the politician. No moment, indeed, could well be less auspicious for dealing decisively with the question than the present, when the latest intelligence is that Dr. Cuno is finding the formation of a new Ministry a task of almost insuperable difficulty. I can claim to be neither prophet nor politician. I am merely a citizen of Germany, interested mainly in social questions. I do not therefore propose or profess to supply an answer to the question whether the existing régime is stable; I can only draw your attention to what seem to me to be the relevant facts of the political situation and the considerations applicable, and leave you to form your own conclusions.

Now, a question which I have been asked over and over again, mainly by American journalists, is this: Has Germany really gone through a revolution? This is a question really germane to the issue, for a revolution is not a matter which comes suddenly and is quickly over, but runs through a variety of phases, during a considerable time, throughout which the stability of any particular régime must be constantly in danger. My answer to the question is unhesitatingly—Yes. There has been a real revolution, not merely a change of the forms of government forced on us by external pressure. It is true that Socialism has not achieved its aspirations; capital still retains its power, and it may well be urged that the economic revolution has failed, but politically it is complete. This being so, I think the principal questions for our consideration must be: What are the forces which guarantee the stability of any régime, and how far do they exist in the present case?

At home, I suppose, some people would be inclined to say that the most important force would be the loyalty of the army and the state officials to the régime in question. To my mind

<sup>1</sup> This paper is a reconstruction of the substance of Dr. Salomon's address, from memory and long-hand notes made at the time. Though written *in oratio recta*, and containing some expressions actually used, it does not profess to be a verbatim report. It has been submitted to and approved by Dr. Salomon.



this test is valueless. We have practically no army left, and most of our officials have necessarily been in office already during the old régime. For my part, I think that the forces to be considered vary for different nations, according to the history and character of the nation, and the spirit and ideas of the age, as well, no doubt, as according to the existence or lack of leading personalities.

But, broadly speaking, I think that the stability of a nation depends upon three factors: firstly, upon the nation's economic resources for the support of its life, secondly, upon the Government's capacity for satisfying the desires and aspirations of the nation, and, lastly, upon the nation's inclination and capacity for unity. It is under these heads that I propose to consider the problem entrusted to me to-night.

#### 1. ECONOMIC RESOURCES.

The economic aspects of the problem are engaging the constant care and attention of persons far better qualified than myself to deal with them, and I propose to content myself, on this head, with a very few observations. I would point out that the economic situation is not really under our internal control, but is to an overwhelming extent dependent upon the external decisions of the other Powers of Europe. But it can hardly be denied that cold and hunger are not the allies of stability, and it is true that at the present time the majority cannot really find the means adequate to a bare subsistence.

The German Government is blamed for raising official salaries. Well, the average monthly income of people—wage-earners of the labouring class, professional people and officials—is equivalent to from 10s. to £2 in English money, and the highest salary of a secretary of state amounts to no more than £40 a year at present rate of exchange. In these circumstances, when we remember that the predominant political power is in the hands of those who in the interests of trades unions and labour have incessantly preached a living wage, we can hardly expect from the Government any lower rate of remuneration for her officials than that now in force.

Again, some people have asserted that the root of the trouble, economically, is that Germany has a population 20,000,000 in excess of what her means can support, and it is suggested that these must die before economic stability is possible. My comment upon this is that, if it be so, they would not die quietly, not so quietly as Russians. Before dying, they would probably rise in



utter despair, even though their effort should prove futile, just as a patient in sickness turns to lie upon his other side, though he knows that it will not relieve him. In short, my summary of this aspect of the situation must be—the eleventh hour has struck long ago, the position is desperate, and it is incumbent upon other nations to come to the rescue.

## 2. THE GOVERNMENT'S CAPACITY FOR SATISFYING THE NATION'S DESIRES.

To deal at all adequately with this branch of the subject, it is necessary to understand something of the political parties in Germany, for it is becoming increasingly evident that any government, to be permanent at the present time, must be a coalition of the same groups which have existed since the revolution.

Now, about half the population of the country, retaining a safe hold upon a third of the seats, is of the labouring class, and is mostly Socialistic. There is, next, the Catholic or Centre party, composed of a mixture of a number of different classes, including some of the working class, which possesses considerable influence in the direction of bridging great contrasts and holding together otherwise irreconcilable elements.

The position and power of the Democratic party is more uncertain. Many people fluctuate between it and the German People's Party, which is largely representative of big interests and finance. We have, in Germany, nothing corresponding to your Liberal party—no real bourgeois party—the middle and educated classes in Germany are without stable political convictions. The reason for this is to be traced in the history of the country. Until comparatively recently, Germany was subdivided into a number of small states, with separate courts and a predominance of power in the hands of the court *entourage* and local aristocracy. Then, after the unification of the Empire, the potential influence of the middle class was crushed by Bismarck and the military régime. When we add to these considerations the facts that middle-class Liberalism in Germany has always been antagonistic to social reform and labour, that it has recently produced no leader of outstanding capacity with the single exception of the Jew, Rathenau, and that the middle classes are, at the present time, the hardest hit economically, it seems safe to say that this party has no past, no present, and in all probability no future.

Outside these parties with which I have dealt lie the two



extremes—the Communists and the Nationalist Conservatives. It is from these, if anywhere, that danger is to be expected. I do not myself consider that there is a serious risk from Bolshevism, except for riots, which, under the circumstances, have been, are, and will be inevitable and to be expected, and which may prove very uncomfortable. Bolshevism is not likely to succeed. For the German workman has too much commonsense. His party is enjoying too much power and has too much experience not to realize that you cannot nationalise imaginary values. He knows that further Socialism would not improve the position, and Marxist doctrines begin to be discredited. He realizes, moreover, that it was the agricultural basis which gave to Bolshevism its strength in Russia, and that it would be bound to fail in a country so highly industrialised as Germany. And, finally, he perceives that the present foreign situation is not such as to allow of risky attempts and experiments of this nature.

There remains the danger from the opposite extreme, the reactionary Nationalist Conservatives. I do not contemplate as a possibility a Conservative majority in the near future. The real danger will come from individuals, what I would call Catilinarian characters, belonging to the former ruling class, with capacity and inclination for adventure and intrigue.

Another dangerous class consists of the professors and teachers in schools and universities, with their undeniable influence on the thought of the coming age. Many within this class are certainly extremely reactionary. Their knowledge may be enormous, but their minds seem utterly out of touch with the march of progressive ideas. There is a real danger here, which cannot be averted by such expedients as the revision of text-books or the removal of pictures of former kings and emperors. This danger will only be overcome, if the aspirations of the nation can be satisfied by the government. The old régime undoubtedly lived on the aspiration for power. But the masses never had any other real aspirations than to work in peace. But I must add, as a note of warning, that our nation, like all others, has its sense of honour, which it is dangerous constantly to tread down and humiliate. Up to the present, it seems to me, the Allies have not been sufficiently alive to the danger thus presented, but have continually affronted the German sense of honour on every possible occasion.

Another aspiration which tends towards stable government is that for a free intellectual and religious life. Germany, it should be remembered, was once the country of poets and philoso-



phers, and signs are not wanting that aspirations of this kind are being re-kindled at the present time. The spread of what is known as the young people's movement, and of a remarkable religious revival permeating all classes and all creeds, are evidences of forces of stability which cannot be excluded from consideration. With regard to the religious revival, it is remarkable that it has extended even to Socialist circles, so that their organs, to which all religion was formerly anathema, now actually publish advertisements of forthcoming religious services.

Lastly, it is a condition favourable to stable government when there is a legal status in accordance with the spirit of the age, a social and political order which is in accord with democratic ideals, with the high standard of general education which gives equal rights to all citizens. In this direction lie the positive merits of the new régime.

### 3. THE NATION'S CAPACITY FOR UNITY.

I now turn to the last aspect of my theme, and I must admit that this is a dark subject in Germany. There is no country in which, up to the present, class hatreds and class antagonisms have been more accentuated and irreconcilable. It is our task to bridge this gulf, and it is a very serious one. And yet I think one may fairly trace in the new régime a tendency to bridge these differences and join these conflicting classes. Apart from political rights the school reform tends in this direction, and the fact, to which I have alluded, that, under existing conditions, coalition is forced upon us, has been a helpful factor. It is more possible now than ever before to bring together the exponents of opposing points of view where each may learn to appreciate and understand his opponent. But much still remains to be done.

There are strong ideal forces alive in the younger generation, and amongst the labour-class, which may go far to achieve the task of unifying labour and capital. This task will be successfully accomplished in my opinion, if only, and only if, the ideals stirring are not destroyed by brutal pressure exerted from without. Here, again, we are confronted with forces over which Germany herself has no control, and on their action, let them remember, depends the destiny probably not only of Germany but of the whole of Europe.



was alienation and war." It will be noted how far we have here travelled from the atmosphere of Bancroft and Sir George Trevelyan. "Loyalty to the Empire was sadly lacking in the average American colonist. He clamoured for the *rights* of Englishmen, but was unconcerned about the *duties*." If, indeed, Franklin's plan at the Albany Congress had been adopted, and Americans had sat in an American parliament, responsible for all intercolonial affairs, the assumption of that responsibility might have "saved the necessity of the ill-fated interference of the British Parliament." But even then some other cause of difference would probably have arisen. Fortunately, in no single respect is the situation similar in the present Commonwealth of British nations.

*Foreign Affairs*. An American Quarterly Review. December 15, 1922. Vol. I, No. 2. (Published by the Council on Foreign Relations, New York. \$1.25.)<sup>1</sup>

THE second number of the Quarterly Review recently launched by our American counterpart, the Council on Foreign Relations, fully maintains the high standard established at the outset. Besides American writers, possessing the highest qualifications for dealing with their respective subjects, contributors from France, Germany, Spain and this country have helped to give the publication a truly international complexion. M. Caillaux, indeed, whose article on "Economics and Politics in Europe" deserves special mention, can hardly be regarded as representing the special views of his own country. In his brilliant, if somewhat bitter and pessimistic, analysis of the present condition of Europe, the Treaty of Versailles is, indeed, subjected to an unqualified condemnation which makes this paper a striking and piquant contrast to that which M. Tardieu contributed to the preceding number of *Foreign Affairs*. Herr Kautsky's article on "Germany since the War" is a more orthodox presentation of the standpoint of his nation, in fact, his attempt to exonerate the Germany of 1918 from all share in the responsibility for the war admittedly attaching to the old régime may be thought by some to bear the taint of mere propaganda. On the other hand, his observations on the attitude of France are forcibly stated, and deserve serious attention. Owing to the disproportionate growth in her population, Germany, he points out, will soon outnumber France by two to one, and French fears are, therefore, justified. But the author sees in this a conclusive argument in favour of the cultivation of more friendly relations.

"Otherwise she (France) is left with no alternative but to strive from now until eternity to prevent Germany's recuperation, to tear open afresh, day by day, the wounds inflicted on her by both war and peace, thus permanently depriving all Europe of tranquillity, security and welfare—a policy which would finally rally all Europe in support of Germany and lead to a catastrophe for herself."

There are many other interesting contributions to which considerations of space unfortunately forbid adequate reference. Mr.

<sup>1</sup> Special annual subscription to members of the B.I.I.A., 18s.

Additional offer, including an annual subscription from December 1922, and a copy of the first issue of the Review (September 1922), 21s. This offer is open until March 1923.

Subscriptions should be sent to the Secretary, British Institute of International Affairs, Malet Street, London, W.C.1. Cheques should be made payable to "The British Institute of International Affairs."



Philip Kerr strives to enlighten the American mind on the subject of British Imperialism, and has provided a clear and interesting picture of the development in the Dominions and in India of the degree of independence and self-government which they at present enjoy. General Tasker Bliss describes "the Evolution of the Unified Command" in an article which will be of special interest to students of military history, who may not, however, all be disposed to agree that the situation before the intervention of the United States was as black as he has painted it. The bibliographical notes of Mr. Harry S. Barnes and Mr. Denys Myers will form, we hope, a permanent feature of this Review, which will be of the greatest assistance to students of international affairs in all parts of the world.

*French Parties and Politics.* By ROGER H. SOLTAU, M.A. (Oxford University Press. 1922. 2s. 6d. net.)

THIS little book, a recent addition to that excellent series, "The World of To-day," has, in addition to its other merits, a decided topical interest. The close connection between the actual politics of a country and its constitution has not been as clearly demonstrated in the case of France as in other cases. At this time of day every newspaper-reader is, or should be, able to interpret the change of attitude on the part of the United States after President Wilson's return from Europe in the light of the American Constitution, and thereby find reasons for American opinions and actions which would otherwise have seemed to him disconcerting and inexplicable. The first ten pages of Mr. Soltau's book, which contain a good summary of the French Constitution, with particular reference to what it says (or implies without saying) regarding the Parliament, President and Cabinet, throw much light on recent developments of French policy. The two outstanding facts on which emphasis is laid are, firstly, the virtual inability of the French President to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies; and, secondly, what Mr. Soltau calls the "curious paradox of French politics," namely, the great power of the Cabinet and its helplessness. Its strength lies in its control of vast patronage; its weakness is due to the impossibility of waving the big stick of dissolution at a recalcitrant Chamber of Deputies when once elected. In other words, the French Chamber holds the Cabinet in the hollow of its hand and can bend it to its will; if the Cabinet disapproves of the policy the majority of deputies favour, they can always force its resignation. This is the reason for the notoriously short life of French Governments and the apparently contradictory phenomenon of one Government after another carrying on the policy of its predecessor, whose fall it had, as often as not, encompassed.

In attempting to make plain in a short space the tangled conditions of French party-organisation, if such a word can be used, Mr. Soltau undertakes an even more difficult task. It is enough to say that he has succeeded admirably. The history of the multifarious groups and parties—for the two terms are not, as he clearly explains, by any means interchangeable—is traced back to the 'nineties, with due appreciation of the influence of two dominant considerations—religious and financial. The final chapter, "The Present Strength of French Parties," is one which every student of politics should have at hand for reference. It is an invaluable aid to the elucidation of Paris correspondents' reports on French internal politics.



## NOTES.

### *Meetings of the Autumn Session.*

ON November 20th, Dr. Alice Salomon gave an interesting address on "The Stability of the Existing Régime in Germany," a summary of which appears on page 30. Lady Aberdeen was in the chair.

In opening the discussion Sir Maurice De Bunsen asked if Dr. Salomon thought that there was hope to be derived from the League of Nations, and what prospect there was of Germany's accession to the League. People were looking forward to the time when she would join. He also inquired as to the prospect of particularism developing in Germany. One member asked whether the mark in Germany did not buy a great deal more than its equivalent in this country. Therefore, was Dr. Salomon's statement that the salary of an official was equal to £40 quite fair? The Hon. Mrs. A. Lyttelton wanted to know the form taken by the religious revival in Germany. Mr. F. N. Keen asked if Dr. Salomon could say how people in this country could expedite Germany's entry into the League. There had been widespread disappointment that Germany had not entered during the recent session of the Assembly. The influence of the League was in favour of unity in a country, and Germany would make valuable contributions to the League. Captain Arthur Watts said that when he was in Munich in September there had seemed to be a prevalent reactionary note. Had that note anything to do with the Centre party?

The Hon. R. H. Brand said he understood that the speaker believed that the stability of Germany largely depended on the Reparation question. He did not see any solution of this. We had lost a golden opportunity at the conclusion of the War (England and America especially). The whole atmosphere was now poisoned by suspicion. It was obvious that M. Poincaré did not believe a word the German Government said, and he still insisted on various pledges which Germany was probably not in a position to give in the form which the French Government wanted. He thought there *were* classes in Germany which regarded the depreciation of the mark with some pleasure, at any rate with indifference. Personally, he did not think this was the case with the Government, but the French did. Germany's financial tactics were very bad during the War, but apart from that, the collapse of the mark had come about through the Reparation muddle. He had come away from Germany feeling that the present Government did not possess the capacity for dealing with the question. It lacked resolution.

Mr. G. P. Gooch asked if the army had become more loyal to the Republic. How far were we to believe stories of secret arming, etc.? Miss C. Marshall said that she had lately been urging at Freiburg University that Germany should enter the League, and had been given reasons against it. How far did Dr. Salomon think the attitude of America was affecting the position? Also, how far did she think



the armies of occupation tended to stabilise the situation? Germany and Austria had been compared by a previous speaker, but it must be remembered that we were not expecting any Reparation payment from Austria.

In replying Dr. Salomon said that as to Germany's entering the League of Nations, it must be remembered that the sense of honour was very strong in every nation. The psychological effect of a Peace Treaty which excluded Germany from the League had been to arouse bitter feelings. It had made it very difficult to speak about the League in Germany. Then the Upper Silesian decision made the German people feel that the present League was nothing but an attempt to make permanent the coalition of the Allies. She did not believe the Government at present would dare to suggest that Germany should apply for admission to the League. In reply to Miss Marshall's questions, the people in the zones of the Army of Occupation could not understand how anyone could entertain the idea of Germany's asking to join the League. There was no peace in the occupied area. If Germany were asked to join it might be different. In comparing Austria and Germany, she pointed out that the whole of Austria had a population of less than that of one German city. She did not think there was any tendency to particularism, except in the case of Bavaria; and she did not believe that Bavaria could live alone. It had no coal, and was too small for independence. The extent of this danger of particularism depended on the policy of France.

With regard to the question as to the loyalty of the army, you could scarcely call 100,000 men an army. As to secret arming, she endorsed the last speech of Rathenau, in which he said that all the searchings of the Allied Commission had found little more than had been found in searching for traces of the old Roman Empire. With reference to Mr. Brand's remarks, people in Germany believed that France had no other wish than to have the Rhineland and to have Germany divided up into small parts that could never be a danger. In answer to the question about the value of the mark, *of course* the mark bought more in Germany than its equivalent here. Otherwise the people would not be alive. How could the Government stop the issue of notes as long as its officials had to be paid? They got their monthly salaries weeks late because the Government could not print notes quickly enough.

A highly interesting discussion on the Near East question took place on November 28th. Dr. A. C. Headlam was in the chair. Professor Toynbee, in opening, indicated the various heads to which the contributions of subsequent speakers should be directed. He regarded it as erroneous to suppose that there would or could be any split over the Khalifate question between Indians and other Moslems. Considering the best security against Turkish aggression to be the strengthening of the Little Entente, or Balkan *bloc*, he advocated a *rapprochement* between Greece and Bulgaria, and an agreement between them to provide a Bulgarian outlet to the Ægean. Now that Eastern Thrace was gone, he suggested that the proposed Bulgarian corridor was of less importance to Greece than formerly. Geographically, the cession of Eastern Thrace to Turkey was comparatively unimportant; the vital point was that the Turks should not get astride of the Maritza. With regard to the Asiatic frontier, Professor Toynbee pointed out that Mosul was in reality Arab rather than Turk, and he



ascribed the Kemalist claim to it to the fact that the British troops had occupied it after the Armistice. Speaking generally, the Turkish claim in Asia explicitly excluded regions where there was an Arab majority, but extended to all other Ottoman Moslem majorities; this would include Kurds, who, however, could look after themselves. Turning to the question of non-Turkish residents, the speaker laid stress on the grave economic effects of a policy which made it impossible for these to live in Turkey. On the one hand, the natural outlet for the surplus Greek population would be checked; on the other, Turkey would find herself short of traders and industrials. With regard to the Capitulations, these were bound to go, the Turks being as keen on getting rid of them as on their territorial claims. But, in the speaker's opinion, they were not worth fighting for, and, having been developed by case-law out of military charters granted long ago under different circumstances, were, he thought, in conflict with the just requirements of the present day.

Sir Harry Lamb agreed with Professor Toynbee as to the Khalifate question, but disagreed with regard to the Capitulations. The loss of these would, in his opinion, make life in Turkey impossible for Europeans for many years, and he regarded the protection which they afforded as necessary if foreigners were to obtain anything like justice. As to the Maritza line, he thought the question was whether the Turks would be content with it. If the unity of the Allies was broken, who could stop the Turks from making claim upon claim and progressing further west? The Turkish spirit he defined as not so much national as continental—it was a question of Asia against Europe. While the Turks were in their present frame of mind, only force could check them; reason and argument were of no effect.

Mr. Harold Spender deplored the execution of the Greek statesmen and generals, and adverted to the question of the Turkish atrocities. Was Western Europe prepared to resist? He feared that the younger generation would not fight. He agreed with Professor Toynbee in advocating for Greece a bold policy of concession and federation.

Major Moore, dealing with the question as to how far the religious factor entered in, declared that, while the Kemalists themselves were not religious, it must be remembered that in the East nationalism *is* religion. The movement begins as a religious sentiment and ends by overflowing as a national or continental policy of Asia against Europe. The Kemalists, therefore, however irreligious, stood for a reality. The national spirit had grown by being menaced, and the true source of the trouble, he thought, was our presence in Asia. Neither the League of Nations nor any other machinery for settling international questions could succeed unless every country concerned tabled the irreducible minimum of the national policy it was prepared to back in arms. No settlement could be stable without the concurrence of all the parties concerned, and it was, therefore, in the speaker's opinion, futile to negotiate in the present case without Russia.

Lady Grogan contributed a most interesting summary of the Bulgarian attitude to the problem, which, being a special aspect of the question on which no other speaker dwelt with such completeness, is reproduced on page 35.

Sir Arthur Crosfield agreed with other speakers that the main hope lay in consolidating and strengthening the Little Entente. Owing to the western Allies having split, civilisation had been swept away in the Turkish dominions.



Mr. H. C. Woods expressed agreement with previous speakers on many points, but emphasised the danger from loss of prestige if we were to climb down over the Capitulations. Captain A. L. Kennedy asked whether there were any elements of the old religious Moslem feeling to serve as an opposition to the Kemalists. Major J. S. Barnes supported the Government policy in Chanak. He believed that the Allies and the Little Entente would stand firm for the Maritza line, but that if further demands on the part of Turkey were encouraged by Russia there might be serious trouble. As to the position of the Greeks in Asia Minor, he did not think they could in any case have stayed there. The facts of geography were against them. He prophesied that the union of the Little Entente would last as long as the menace from Turkey was great, but that if and when Russia reverted to her old anti-Turkish policy, Bulgaria would either ally herself with Russia to get back her old territories, or with Serbia to divide the spoils. In either case Greece would lose territorially. The only other possible solution would come if the League of Nations imposed a settlement on federal terms.

Colonel Pope-Hennessy said he rose mainly to secure the intervention of Sir F. Maurice in the discussion. In his opinion war with Turkey would need from twenty to thirty divisions. His experience in recruiting led him to believe we could secure for an unpopular war 30,000 men a month for two months. This being so, were we in a position to take up the attitude we had with respect to Chanak? As to the future, if we relied on the Little Entente, this involved a tacit admission that the Great Entente was finished, and the danger of opposing Turkey with the Balkan *bloc* was that she would look round for a serviceable ally and would find it in Russia.

Sir F. Maurice agreed that a war of conquest would entail the force suggested by the last speaker. But for defence four divisions and our fleet would be sufficient. He wished to apply a corrective to the pessimism of previous speakers. The Turk would not reach the Adriatic. Turkey was not a great military Power, and could not have driven our force out of Chanak, or she would have done so. He regarded our Chanak policy as the only sane policy. The Turk was bluffing. The situation in Asia was another matter. In regard to the claim for Mosul we stood alone. The Little Entente was not concerned. While our original occupation of Mosul was open to criticism, we had now serious commitments there, and were also the mandatory of the League of Nations. The important matter here was to secure the agreement of the French. As regarded the Straits, Constantinople having been ceded, we could only pass the Straits with the goodwill of Turkey. The chances of securing this were hopeful. The tenure of the Kemalists was precarious, and with the hopeless Angora Government behind them they had to play to the gallery. But their leaders were sensible enough to see that they were faced with the task of governing with an empty treasury, and would want money very soon. This we could give them, and herein lay our opportunity of securing satisfactory terms.

Lord Edward Gleichen corroborated the last speaker. His information was that the Kemalists were impressed by English commercial methods, and also by our stand at Chanak when the French and Italians retired. The Arab attitude to our position in Mesopotamia was that, while they needed and welcomed help in administration, they did not want our fingers in every pie. It was, in their opinion, unnecessary for us to incur further expense in this region. Mosul,



they thought, presented no difficulty. The probable outcome would be a Turko-Arab alliance against Russia. Admiral Fremantle shared the optimism of the last two speakers. The fear was less of a Turkish than of a Slav drive to the west. With 800,000 men in the Jugo-Slav army, with a large and efficient Czecho-Slovak army, and a Greek army reformed by the Venizélist régime, we were adequately protected against the Turk. Freedom of the Straits was a phrase of many meanings. He agreed with Sir F. Maurice that Turkey controlled the Straits, whatever demilitarisation might be ordered. All we could insist on was that if the Turks closed the Straits they must close them both ways.

Professor Toynbee, replying on the whole discussion, agreed that Bulgaria was the difficulty in consolidating the South-East European *bloc*. The internal policy of Jugo-Slavia was crucial. He agreed with Sir F. Maurice as to the influence on Kemalists words and actions of the Angora Government. In answer to Captain Kennedy, he thought that those in authority were usually more given to atrocities than the people at large. Religion did not normally affect the relations of the latter with those of other faiths, but was a force which could be stirred up.

In concluding, the Chairman thought that Greek policy of late years had been very foolish. The Bulgarian difficulty was an instance of the fruits of our policy of over-penalising quondam enemies. He agreed that we should stand up to the Turks. The Kemalists revolt and advance had ruined Turkey, and they were at the mercy of richer Powers. As between Greek and Turk, the distinction between Asia and Europe had no historical basis. The real distinction was between a Greek coastline and Turkish highlands in the Anatolian interior. Ultimately, he thought, this division, which had always existed, would be found to be the real one.

On December 5th, Lord Edward Gleichen presided, when Mr. G. W. T. Omond gave an address on the subject of Belgium with special reference to the Flemish movement. Owing to the business capacity of the people, he said, and the sound financial policy of the Government, the recovery of Belgium from the effects of the German occupation had been remarkably swift and complete. The national debt had, however, increased to seven times its pre-war figure, with the result that, though individuals were rich, the State was poor.

By the introduction of manhood suffrage, including a restricted woman's vote accorded as a privilege to certain classes of sufferers from the War, and the abolition of plural voting, the Catholic majority had been greatly reduced, and the present Government was a coalition of Catholics and Liberals. These parties, formerly separated by religious differences, were becoming more united by a common antagonism to Socialism. The Socialism of Belgium was, however, of a moderate type: individualism was promoted by the fact that most of the land was held by peasant proprietors, and, since the state railways had always been run at a loss, projects of further nationalisation were discouraged.

In the field of foreign affairs, the most striking change was the abandonment of Belgian neutrality. While this lasted, in spite of numerous warnings and a remarkable forecast of the late War made between 1881 and 1887, measures of national defence had been unpopular. It was not until June 1913 that anything like an adequate measure of compulsory military service had been passed. Small wonder, then, if Belgium felt that to rely on treaties of neutrality was



a dangerous policy. With regard to the League of Nations, the Belgian attitude was that there was no real League, but merely a document purporting to create one. The result of this attitude was the secret defensive military agreement made with France in 1920.

Mr. Omond next dealt with the Flemish movement. There was, he said, no real racial antagonism between Flemings and Walloons; the real quarrel was between two groups of Flemings. The movement was literary in its origin, but soon became political, and, when exploited by the Germans during the War, reached a dangerous stage of active disloyalty to Belgium. Numerous instances were given of the depths of treason to which members of the activist party had sunk, under the influence of Germany, culminating in May 1918 in a plan to let the German forces through the Belgian lines. The movement, said Mr. Omond, still continued. The parish priests were its chief supporters. A conciliatory law giving the Flemish language an official status had not completely satisfied the extremists, who wished to suppress the French language entirely in the celebrated University of Ghent.

The driving force was Holland, but the Dutch Government was cautious and lent no official support to the movement. The present idea of the Flemings seemed to be to exploit political differences between France and Great Britain, with the object of enlisting British support for the movement. It was, however, a question to be settled by the Belgians themselves.

Dr. J. C. McClure agreed with Mr. Omond that the movement was not racial, but was one in which Fleming was divided against Fleming. He considered it was influenced both from Holland and from Germany, and was a serious phase of a Pan-Teutonic movement. Belgium was an interesting country, where the rival Teutonic and Roman civilisations met without any geographical frontier. The result was like a blend of beer or stout and champagne—a taste for which was not readily acquired. He expressed his personal sympathy for the Walloons, but agreed that the question should be left as a purely domestic one for Belgian decision. Mr. Isidore Winner disagreed with the previous speakers. There was, in his opinion, no Pan-Teutonic agitation. If there had been Dutch support for the movement, Belgium had asked for it by her provocative attitude in the matter of Limburg and the Scheldt at the Peace Conference. If such grievances as the French University in Ghent, a wholly Flemish district, were remedied, in his opinion disloyalty would disappear.

Mr. G. P. Gooch rose to ask a number of questions. (1) What was alleged to be the justification of the Franco-Belgian military agreement? (2) Mr. Omond had indicated two lines of cleavage, *Bourgeois v. Socialist* with a religious sub-division in the former, and *Walloon v. Fleming*. Were these two lines in any way related? And what was the present state of the religious difference in the *Bourgeois* parties? (3) Had Belgium any idea of renewing the demands made on Holland immediately after the War? (4) To what extent were German traders returning to Antwerp?

Mr. Omond replied: (1) The Franco-Belgian agreement was purely military and purely defensive. Such an agreement could not be made public whatever the League of Nations might think, and he, Mr. Omond, thought the want of confidence in the League evinced by Belgium was wise and justifiable. (2) Roughly, the Walloons were free-thinkers, and the Flemings Catholic, but there were many cross-cleavages. Owing to a conscience clause in recent legislation



the religious question in the schools was now in abeyance. (3) There was, he thought, no present intention of renewing the claims against Holland, which had never been very official. (4) The Belgians were afraid of German dumping and had endeavoured to check it, but there had, undoubtedly, been much trade. At the same time, not many German merchants were yet returning to Antwerp.

On Tuesday, December 12th, when Mr. Asquith presided at the reading of Mr. Gooch's paper, which appears on an earlier page, the rooms of the Institute were crowded almost beyond their capacity. The discussion which followed this most suggestive and controversial paper was started by Sir Valentine Chirol. He thought that Mr. Gooch attached too much of the responsibility for the war to Russo-Serb ambitions and intrigues, and too little to the bullying and bribing policy pursued by Austria for twenty-five years. In the matter of Germany's responsibility, consideration should be given to the determined and deliberate creation of a war-spirit throughout the nation, a policy in the furtherance of which the Kaiser, he thought, played a leading part. Sir Valentine put in a good word for Holstein, whom he knew personally, and regarded as friendly and sympathetic to England. In conclusion he quoted a *dictum* of Holstein's: "This Emperor will either destroy Germany or die in a madhouse."

Mr. Asquith desired to correct Mr. Gooch's view that the Entente involved England in any obligation of honour or otherwise to intervene in the War. The two alternative policies which at first sight seemed open to this country in the years before the crisis were, (a) splendid isolation, which in practice led to friction all round, and (b) to join one of the two great European alliances. We did neither. British policy with regard to the Entente was to cultivate friendly relations with France and Russia by removing the causes of hostility. And we were prepared to adopt the same course with Germany, and were, in fact, in process of settling our outstanding difficulties in the years immediately preceding the War. In view of what was sometimes said of Lord Grey in relation to secret diplomacy, it was interesting to note that the arrangements relating to Bagdad and Portugal broke down because Lord Grey insisted on their publication, and Germany refused. Had it not been for the violation of Belgian neutrality, which brought into play a definite treaty obligation, neither France nor Russia had any reason or right to count on British assistance, and this fact had been freely acknowledged by M. Poincaré and others.

Mr. F. D. Acland corroborated Mr. Asquith's statement, pointing out that in fact Lord Grey had answered "No" on various occasions when France had asked whether, if war resulted in certain circumstances, she could rely on British support. He thought France was an uncomfortable neighbour for Germany, and that the German fears from that quarter and from Russia were possibly to some extent justified.

Mr. P. A. Molteno, on the other hand, shared the views expressed by the reader of the paper. He found evidence in support of this opinion in the agreement with France for the disposal of the French fleet and our own, which, he added, was a secret agreement.

General Sir Frederick Maurice, in support of the Chairman's contention, stated that the War Office from 1904 to 1913 was inclined to complain of the fact that the indefinite character of the Entente made military arrangements rest on a hypothetical foundation. The



French General Staff was quite alive to this provisional character of the arrangements. The Kaiser had been described by Mr. Gooch as a "well-meaning blunderer." He thought that enough weight was not given to the "shining armour" phases of the Emperor's character. It was not unimportant that the German constitution gave the Chief of the General Staff direct access to the Emperor. In 1904 the speaker had himself seen the "shining armour" side of Wilhelm II, when he was privileged to attend the manoeuvres in the company of Schlieffen and Ludendorff. On this occasion Ludendorff said to Schlieffen in his hearing, "Go to him this afternoon and you'll get the two army corps," a prediction verified by the sequel.

In reply Mr. Gooch explained that his purpose was not to discuss the responsibility for the War, but to summarise the historical material which had recently been published. As to what Sir Valentine Chirol had said, Mr. Gooch reiterated his conviction of the extreme gravity of the Russo-Serb menace. Up to the murder of the last Obrenovitch king, Serbo-Austrian relations had been friendly. The change of dynasty marked a new diplomatic orientation. With regard to Germany, he agreed that that country was filled with war-passion, but there was still, in his opinion, in 1914, no "will to war" on the part of Wilhelm, Bethmann, or Jagow, but only criminal levity. Holstein was dismissed in 1906 because he was spoiling for war with France over Morocco. His statements to friends after his retirement were not reliable. He was a dangerous man. Finally, the point contested by the Chairman was, and would, he thought, long remain a matter of opinion. In support of his view Mr. Gooch quoted Mr. Lloyd George, and referred to Lord Loreburn's book. The Belgian treaty obligation, in the words of Gladstone or Palmerston, "empowered but did not compel" this country to go to war. And for this very reason, in 1870, two new treaties had to be made *ad hoc*. Mr. Asquith here remarked that these treaties were only necessitated by the doubts as to whether the obligation was joint and several or joint only.

On December 19th, Professor J. Y. Simpson read a most illuminating paper on "The Russian Border States," which it is hoped to publish in a later issue of the Journal. We regret that, owing to lack of space, we are unable adequately to summarise the interesting discussion which followed this paper. Mr. L. C. Wharton, in opening, urged consideration of Lithuanian interests and aspirations. Mr. R. F. Young drew attention to the part played by Germany in stirring up agitation among the lesser nationalities of Russia. Mr. Charles Wright asked for a definition of "moral support" as distinct from material support, thereby raising much discussion, in which Colonel Steel, Professor Pollard and another member joined.

In reply Professor Simpson said that, in his view, moral support implied *de jure* recognition and not necessarily the supply of arms and men.

The chair was taken by Commander Hilton Young, who, at the close of the debate, questioned whether sufficient importance had been attached to economic forces rather than to the upspringing of national impulse in the genesis of the Baltic States. The States had been in touch with the outside world and could, therefore, afford to break off from Russia. Should the breaking away of the Baltic units have been mainly due to economic considerations, might they not fall back again to Russia if the Bolshevik element disappeared?



*Library.*

The thanks of the Committee are due to the following for welcome additions to the Library: Mr. R. Norman Angell, Mr T. D. Dunlop, Colonel Garsia, Major-General Lord Edward Gleichen, Mr. A. L. Kennedy, Sir. Frederick Maurice, the Hon. Newton W. Rowell, Professor A. J. Toynbee, Sir Charles Walston, Mr. H. C. Woods, Mr. C. Torley-Duwel, the League of Nations, the Lithuanian Legation, the Netherlands Foreign Office, the Clarendon Press, and Col. Luxmoore.

*Royal Colonial Institute.*

The Library Committee of the Royal Colonial Institute has generously offered the use of its Library to members of the B.I.I.A. Those members wishing to avail themselves of this privilege are requested to obtain, from the Secretary of the B.I.I.A., a letter of introduction to the Librarian of the Royal Colonial Institute.

*Report on Foreign Affairs.*

Members who have not as yet received this valuable Report, produced by the Empire Parliamentary Association and issued as a supplement to the Journal of the Institute, are reminded that if they wish to do so, they should apply to the Secretary of the Institute, Malet Street, London, W.C.I. As has been explained, the Report can only be issued to members who undertake to treat it as confidential, and a form to be signed for this purpose will be sent immediately upon application to the Secretary.

## CORRESPONDENCE.

*To the Editor of the Journal of the B.I.I.A.*

*League of Nations Union,  
15 Grosvenor Crescent, S.W.*

DEAR SIR,

During the Debate on the Near East at the Institute on November 28th Lady Grogan, in her most interesting speech upon Bulgaria, stated that Bulgarian Minorities outside Bulgaria could look for no help from the League of Nations, since appeals to its protection were not listened to unless they expressed sentiments of loyalty to the State under whose Government the Minority is living.

I hope Lady Grogan will forgive me if I have misquoted her; I do not think that in any case I can have mistaken her general meaning, which was, I believe, that there is something in the League's regulations regarding Minority petitions which precludes Minorities from taking advantage of the protection offered them under the Minorities Treaties.

Here seems to be a misunderstanding of facts. The Council of the League of Nations has laid down four rules for the guidance of Minorities when forwarding petitions. These rules are

- (a) That petitions or complaints should have as their object the protection of Minorities in accordance with the Treaties.
- (b) That they should not be submitted in the form of a request to break off political relations between the Minority in question and the State of which it forms part.
- (c) That they should not emanate from an anonymous or unsubstantiated source.
- (d) That they should be drawn up in temperate language.



I do not think that there is anything here to debar a Minority suffering under genuine injustice from seeking the aid which it has the right to demand. The only check imposed is upon the political propagandist, desirous of exploiting legitimate Minority grievances to stir up political trouble in the State.

The regulations provide a safeguard against this which the Minorities themselves should welcome, for nothing could be more damaging to their interests than suspicion of the singleness of their motives when they appeal to the League.

It is very much to be wished that the Minority Treaties may be freely invoked. President Wilson described them as "part of the very basis of world peace," and a study of their carefully worked-out provisions inclines one to agree with his view. But so far there has been too little inclination to put them to the test. The Germans in Poland have indeed made some use of them, but in most countries Minorities have been more ready to cry their grievances aloud in the Press than to forward them with chapter and verse to the League of Nations. It may be that they have been restrained from seeking its help partly by some such misunderstanding of conditions as Lady Grogan's speech indicated.

If that be so I should like to urge everyone who is in personal touch with members of Minority groups in the Central European and Balkan States to spread knowledge of the real facts. Any petition sent to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations which complies with the rules given above is brought to the attention, not only of the Council of the League but of all Member States. The government of the State from which the Minority petition emanates is given an opportunity of making comments on the document, and these are circulated with it. Thus the fullest and the most effective publicity is ensured for the case.

The League of Nations Union will gladly furnish further details about the League's procedure and the actual operation of the League's machinery with regard to petitions that have already been brought before the Council.

Yours faithfully,

BLANCHE E. C. DUGDALE.

Nov. 30th, 1922.

### FORTHCOMING MEETINGS.

#### *General Meetings.*

*At the Institute, Malet Street, W.C.1., at 8.15 p.m.*

- |                     |   |
|---------------------|---|
| Tuesday, Jan. 23rd. | "The Trials of the Greek Ministers." By Mr. JOHN MAVROGORDATO. Chairman: The Rt. Hon. Sir MAURICE DE BUNSEN.  |
| " Feb. 6th.         | "The Fascisti Movement." By Dottore CAMILLO PELLIZZI. Chairman: Mr. G. M. TREVELYAN.                          |
| " Feb. 20th.        | "The position of France." By Mr. H. WICKHAM STEED.  |
| " March 6th.        | "The Labour Section of the League of Nations." By Mr. H. B. BUTLER. Chairman: The Rt. Hon. J. R. CLYNES, M.P. |
| " March 20th.       | "The Political Situation in the United States." By Mr. PHILIP KERR.   |

#### *Group Meetings.*

*At the Institute, Malet Street, W.C.1., at 8.15 p.m.*

- Tuesdays, February 13th and March 13th. "The Near East." Led by Professor A. J. TOYNBEE.

The dates of other group meetings will be announced later.



# THE LIBRARY

A REMINDER OF ITS NEEDS

---

*Extract from letter circulated to members, December 10, 1921:*

“ It is hoped that members of the Institute will assist in the formation of the Library, and I am, therefore, on behalf of the Executive Committee, to ask you whether you would be able to contribute gifts of books (especially modern standard books on international relations and foreign countries) or periodicals or modern maps and atlases. If so, would you be kind enough to address to the Secretary a list of any works which you are able to offer.”

MALET STREET,  
LONDON, W.C. 1.

*Tel.:* MUSEUM 6183





PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY RICHARD CLAY & SONS, LIMITED,  
BUNGAY, SUFFOLK.



ank (Eastbourne.)  
Aug. 25.

Dear Noel.

Thanks for  
yr letter. If ever you  
feel inclined to  
write an article  
on any subject,  
let me know.

Yr Memorandum  
is deeply interesting.  
I am (as always) have  
to quote George Godd.



been) one of those who  
believe that the war  
will end in something  
like a balanced settlement  
& that it will continue<sup>settlement</sup>  
long after such a  
settlement is practicable.  
Therefore I am most  
anxious for American  
mediation at the  
earliest moment, &  
I fear that nothing  
else can end the  
war. But I also  
feel that the Allies



are so cheered by  
the victories of the  
summer that they  
would scout any offer  
or suggestion of stopping  
short of the 'complete  
victory' which they  
expect. You can see  
the working of the  
typical military mind  
in the Military Correspondent  
of the Times today.  
The hardest fight for  
reason & moderation  
will not be against  
'the people, as we



Says, but against the  
military leaders &  
their advisers. Bismarck  
beat them in 1866 &  
was beaten by them  
in 1871, & both those  
occasions teach clear  
lessons. I am in something  
like despair at the future  
if we dictate terms.  
Russia will be supreme  
on the Continent; & I  
trust her no more than  
I did before the war.

I did not know you  
with a letter when you  
lost your Mother. But just  
let me express my sympathy  
now. Mine is happily still  
with me, just as so. It affects



Jan. 28.

SOUTH VILLA,  
CAMPDEN HILL ROAD. W.

Dear Buxton.

I had addressed an envelope to you yesterday morning & intended to send you a line today. I could not say last night how deeply I felt in defeat, - for the sake of the House



even more than for your own.  
I feel so unworthy to be  
here & you - so much  
more experienced - not in -  
I had looked forward so  
keenly to seeing a good  
deal of you & talking over  
many things. But I beg  
you to take advantage of  
one of the first bye-lections  
for our sakes too! You are so  
brave & good that I feel it all the more  
keenly. Don't reply. Ever yours George Hoock



June 12, 44 Artl

UPWAY CORNER,  
CHALFONT ST. PETER,  
BUCKS.

Dear Noel <sup>in yet.</sup>  
<sup>mt drill Poles.</sup>  
<sup>try avoid chilling.</sup>

Thanks for your letter.

I shall be glad to have an  
article (about 3,000 words) some  
time on 'anti-national annexations'.  
Though we can decide the title later.  
It must be written with care & tact.



neither for nor against any  
single country, it should take  
as its text Article II of the Atlantic  
Charter, which is absolutely  
sound. Minor frontier changes  
should not be ruled out by this  
general formula. Of course the  
Polish outcry against Russian  
demands is quite inconsistent with



The demand for East-  
Prussia. You will find the Polish  
case for annexing East Prussia  
strongly & ably argued in Robert  
Machtay's little book East Prussia  
published last autumn. It is deplorable  
that Stalin does not content himself  
with smaller frontier changes.  
Perhaps you will let me make any

UPWAY CORNER  
CHALFONT ST  
BUCKS.

2



suggestions which  
occur to me when you have  
written yr article! There is no  
hurry. I am glad you think there  
is a chance of something better  
than the mere "right" of the stronger-  
side.

We are so glad the eyes  
are better.

Affectionate greetings from us both. George Good



7A  
June 6, 44. Affectionate greetings from  
us both.

Dear Noel. George Gooch

Thanks for yr letter <sup>re Annex in</sup>

Hansard. The Times report gave you  
only two sentences, but I now find  
that you made a long & important  
speech. I think it is excellent, both  
in its determination to destroy this  
wicked regime & in its grave warning



about a settlement. I have read the  
whole debate & found it most  
interesting. Vansittart alone spits  
out his venom as usual. As for  
your argument that annexation,  
contrary to local <sup>lead to wars,</sup> wishes, surely it is  
obvious that they create feelings  
which predispose peoples to war.  
The Revanche movement in France



in France between 1871 &  
1914. & the attitude of people like  
Clemenceau & Poincaré, Déroulede,  
Barrès, M<sup>me</sup> Adam, etc. is as good  
an argument or rather illustration  
as can be desired. Macedonia is  
another obvious example. I see  
Lord Cranborne said that you seemed



almost more concerned about the  
future of Germany than of Poland.  
That it is not justified for you  
are trying to prevent the Poles  
entering on a dangerous course.  
I am, however, quite hopeless about  
this matter, as Poland's claim to  
East Prussia has been publicly affirmed  
by Stalin & Churchill. Never mind.  
You have done your best & your warning  
is on record. We hope the eyes are better.



April 21, 1931

**SOUTH VILLAGE**

**76, CAMPDEN HILL ROAD, W.**

Dear Noel.

I have read the book with much interest, & I think he has done his work well. He should look to the spelling of some names such as Aeprenthal, Bethmann, etc. I have corrected one or two when I noticed them. He will doubtless ask the writers' permission



to publish letters, - et.  
Sir M. de B. on p. 61-2,  
which seems to me about  
the most interesting thing  
in the book.

Critics will doubtless  
say that it is a hymn  
of praise to N.B. but  
that will not harm  
you, as yr friends know  
that vanity is not one  
of yr failings.

To me the most important  
part of the book is



ch. 2 - because it deals  
with the great issue of  
responsibility for the war.  
Prolonged study of the  
documents, etc. has led  
me to the conclusion  
that Grey never had a  
free hand (though he  
always said he had),  
since he was tied to  
France by the events  
of 1905 before he took  
office. To have broken  
out of his cage wd  
have needed a much



bigger & stronger man, - say  
another Paterson.  
France had got us & held  
us tight, & German policy  
(apart from our blunders  
like the Mansion House  
speech) was so clumsy &  
heavy-handed that Grey  
got the worst impression  
of Berlin. You & I  
showman think Grey could  
- as well as should - have  
escaped from his cage;  
& it is this conviction  
(which I used to share)  
that interests me to see  
elaborated. Affectionately  
G.P.G.



December 26, 1940

Your old friend  
UPWAY CORNER,  
CHALFONT ST. PETER,  
BUCKS.

Dear Noel.

George Gooch

I was so interested in the  
typed report of your speech at the  
recent Conference called by the Nat:  
Peace Council (which I read to my  
wife) that I am tempted to send  
you some notes I compiled as long



ago as September. My programme is  
- a moderate settlement  
with new men in Germany to work  
it. Whether the Nazis can be over-  
thrown we cannot at present foretell.  
If not, I have no hope of a tolerable  
settlement for the ravished nations  
of Europe. I agree with you that it  
wd be wrong to hold out the hope of  
a restoration of the old frontiers of Poland  
& Czechoslovakia. We hope you & your  
dear ones are well & send best wishes & greetings.



The Balance of Power<sup>3</sup>

SOUTH VILLA,  
76, CAMPDEN HILL ROAD. W. 8.

remains the master-key to our policy. Now that Germany is strong again & no longer stands alone, the fear of a defeated France & a victorious Germany dominating the Continent is stronger than ever. The only escape



from our entanglement is the  
reconciliation of France with  
Germany, which is scarcely  
to be expected while the Nazis  
are in the saddle.

Ever yrs  
George Gooch



November 13, '35. | Dear love to Cecil & May.  
Affectionate greetings

Dear Noel. (From my wife & myself. George Good)

Thanks for yr kind  
letter. I am all right again  
though living more quietly for  
the present. We have taken a  
little house here for a time, as  
my wife did not feel up to the



strain of London in  
war-time. I hope you are  
not in anxiety about any of your boys.

I am against a Conference unless  
the restoration of independent  
states in Poland & Czechoslovakia  
& the right of Austria to decide  
her own destiny are conceded



Problems (such as the Sudeten  
Districts, Teschen, Danzig etc.)  
are in need of fresh discussion).  
Since Hitler cannot possibly  
consent to discharge his body  
before being defeated, I think  
that a Conference without a priori  
and suggest to him that we are  
weaker in resolve than we really are.  
Nations can always tell us if there is any  
readiness to accept our three cardinal conditions.



in advance. <sup>3</sup> These  
three conditions seem to me,  
as essential as was the restoration  
of the independence of Belgium  
in our 'peace aims' during the  
last war. (There is no question  
of demanding the return to the  
status quo ante, as difficult

UPWAY CORNER

CHAUFORT ST. PETER.



Feb. 21, 1940.

UPWAY CORNER,  
CHALFONT ST. PETER,  
BUCKS.

Dear Noel. <sup>Frank</sup>

It was good of you to  
send me your thoughtful Memorandum  
on which I have scribbled a  
few comments. I regard Hitler  
as a miniature Napoleon &  
if he remains in control of Ger-



many when peace  
returns I shall feel that  
the war has been more or less  
in vain. On yt programme only  
the ramp of Poland would remain  
cut off from the sea. I gather  
you think he wd keep Austria.  
It wd not be a 100 p.c. triumph  
for him, but he wd be able



3

UPPER CORNER,  
CHALFONT ST. PETER,  
BUCKS.

to claim the proud  
title Mehrer des Reiches,  
enlarger of the Reich -  
which the Kaiser was '80  
glad to assume when he  
got Heligland. I do not  
imagine that the overthrow  
of what your party manifests



rightly calls this  
accursed regime would  
automatically bring peace &  
security to Europe. But  
while it is there I see  
no chance of better things.  
Since they raped Czechoslovakia  
I have felt that we are con-  
fronted with an incorrigible  
megalomaniac. Our affectionate greeting  
George Docht