

Haskell

Conditions in Macedonia

Plevna

22 May 1931

Mr Edward B. Haskell to Lord Dickenson:
22 May 1931 writing from Bulgaria

There has been a
great improvement
in last 3 years

.....Relating to a recent visit to Macedonia, Mr Haskell says " For 20 years I lived in Salonica as an itinerant missionary of the Congregational or "American Board of Missions located at 14 Beacon St., Boston, Mass. One of the districts where our work was strongest and which we oftenest visited was Stroumitza.

When I first visited this district in 1893 there were Evangelical Churches already established in the city and the villages of Mourtino and Monospitovo, 5-6 miles away, as well as a small community at Velyousa. Later I was instrumental in establishing a flourishing church at Coleshino 9 miles from the city.

The district was assigned to Bulgaria by the treaty of Bukarest in 1913, but was given to Yugo-slavia in 1919. It always was Bulgarian except for the Turks, many of whom moved away after the Balkan wars.

For a time after the Serbian annexation the Bulgarian "Committee" kept up its organisation in the district and bands of "Komitadjis" visited it from time to time. The hapless inhabitants paid taxes to the Serbs and forced contributions to the "organisation". If they failed to report the visit of a band, and the Gov t somehow learned of it, dire punishment with tortures was visited upon them. If they reported to the Govt the band took savage vengeance.

Finally the people found it intolerable to live under two governments and notified the "committee" that if more bands visited the district the inhabitants would join the troops in driving them out. I am positively and credibly informed that no insurgents have been in the Stroumitza region for at least five years. Yet the people are

Sounds
peace

treated with the utmost suspicion and severity. The Govt spends large amounts on spies and secret police, as well as on garrison and regular police. Naturally secret agents wish to justify their salaries by reporting all sorts of imaginary plots and the process intensifies suspicions and repressions.

Polish count

I had no opportunity to visit points in the interior inhabited by Bulgarians under Greek rule. But the atmosphere seemed to me freer in Greece. I arrived in Salonica the morning of May 13 at 8.15 and left next day at 10.20. I was not required to register at a police station nor to obtain a police permit to leave the city or country.

I had a Yugoslav visa from Athens to remain six months in the country. Naturally my passport was examined at the border on entering, May 14. On leaving the train at Stroumitza stati (two or three hours from the city by auto) a soldier demanded my passport, wrote down particulars, and returned it. As our auto with five passengers passed through Valandovo a soldier halted it and looked over the travelling papers of natives and foreigners. I went to the home of an old friend at Stroumitza - a man who had served me as errand boy and buyer at Salonica when a boy and whom I had encouraged to get a secondary education. He was delighted to see me and, altho admitting that my stay might cause him some unpleasantness on the part of the authorities, he would not let me go to an hotel.

I had not seen Stroumitza since it was Bulgarian territory in November 1914. My host said we better go at once to announce my arrival to the authorities. Under the dictatorship, officials do not have the same titles as under civilised government, but he who corresponds to chief of police was courteous. He said if I wished to visit any village I must give notice before starting. Also must come to him before leaving the city for any point. Particulars of passport were

Russian

were registered in a book. When I left the morning of the 16th, it was recorded that I was going to Skopliye, and at the edge of the city a soldier stopped the autot and looked over all travelling papers. At Skopliye my pass was recorded on arrival and on leaving.

At Stroumitza, I associated almost wholly with old friends part of whom I have known from childhood. I found that Serbian is taught exclusively in the schools and Bulgarian spoken in the homes and streets and the children do not know either language well! The teachers often ask the children "What are you?" They answer "We are Macedonians". The teachers angrily answer "No, you are born Serbians, you little rascals."

Quite possible the children know "Serbian" - excess of zeal.

Financial stagnation is very bad, as everywhere, but taxes are ruthlessly exacted, the oxen of the peasants being sold and the owners sometimes imprisoned till they borrow the money to buy. A woman whom I knew came from a village when I was there. Her oxen had been impounded the day before and her son imprisoned that morning. She asks for a loan of 50 dinars with which she hoped to get the oxen free to go on with the farm work. As she could not get the loan I gave her the money. A village deputation had gone to Skopliye to beg higher authorities to spare their oxen I did not learn the result. Most of the Serbians of the district are well-paid and well-dressed officials, while the Bulgarian population is threadbare and ragged.

Some friends invited me to their homes and some called on me, ~~xxx~~ saying they dared not invite me. The Serbians detest having foreigners come around and seeing the situation. They maltreat those whom they suspect of telling the truth to foreigners. My friends in the city advised me not to go to any villages as the people might suffer after I left. It also seemed best that

They no longer detest visits of foreigners

that I make no public address though they would have loved to hear me preach again. Probably I visited this region a hundred times under the rule of thaul Hamid without feeling the weight of constraint and fear that now oppressed my friends and myself. They do not dare to correspond with Bulgaria so I do not know whether any evil results followed my visit. My sole object in going was to see the faces of people whom I love once more before they and I die.

It is my duty to record the worst religious persecution of which I know outside Russia - and in some respects worse than Russian. I preface with an explanation.

Missionaries of the American Board and their ^{native} associates established churches (always called 'evangelical' and not congregational' at the city of Radovish (now ' Radovoshta'), the city of Stroumitza, and the near village of Mnospitovo in about 1889 to 1891. Stroumitza is about 60 miles almost directly north of Salonica and Radovishta is 18 miles N.W of Stroumitza. A good church was in existence at Mourtino near Stroumitza in 1893 and another was established at Coleshino about 1911. Thus when the Serbians annexed these places in 1919 or 1920 the Evangelical churches had existed for nearly a generation There also was a church at Monastir (Now Bitolya) and a regular service, with a pastor, at Uskub (Skopliye)

After these places passed into Serbian hands it was evident that missionaries from Bulgaria could not visit them. As the American Methodist Episcopal Church had work in Yugoslavia, with an American superintendent in charge, the American Board requested the Methodist Board to take over the work in Macedonia ("South Serbia",) and this was carried out about 1922. There was an ordained pastor

Mr. Sillers might know about this. I don't, but it sounds quite unlike the G.A. attention towards Y.M.C.A. etc. This is based on Bulgarian brochures of Haskell etc.

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at Stroumitza who performed marriages, baptisms, etc. He had been Temkoff and became Temkovitch.

About 1921 the Serbian authorities announced that because the Methodist Episcopal Church is not "recognised" in Yugoslavia, its pastors must perform no more baptisms and marriages. This seems to have been the first step in a systematic effort to destroy the churches. As Radovishta had been weakened by removals all possible pressure was put on there first. One evening a bomb was thrown against the Church building, in which the unmarried preacher had a room. He dared not sleep there after this and not long after, the church building was set on fire at night and no one allowed to try to extinguish the flames, so that the furniture, the harmonium and preacher's library were destroyed. No Macedonian doubts that Government agents threw the bomb and lighted the fire. The Methodist Church has now a Yugoslav subject as Superintendent of its Mission and on his last two visits to Radovishta he has been ordered by the local authorities to take the next bus out of the city.

A few months ago it was proclaimed that all marriages and baptisms performed by Methodists since the Serbians annexed this territory are null and void and must be performed anew by priests of the Eastern Orthodox Church. Thus people who have been married for 8 or 9 years find themselves unmarried and their children illegitimates. In this I think the Serbian tyranny outdoes the Bolshevik.

A few days before my arrival the grandson of a deceased Protestant friend of mine from Mourtino was killed in an automobile accident. He was of the third generation of Protestants in that village. Yet the evangelical preacher was not allowed to bury him and the ceremony was performed by an orthodox priest.

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Learning that the Lutheran Church is recognised in Yugoslavia, and that it has a Slovene bishop, the Stroumitza Protestants investigated the possibility of uniting with it. I learned that they discovered that it will not be allowed: that Protestantism is to be stamped out in "South Serbia", and the people taught that they must be Serbian Orthodox Christians "as their ancestors were" (sic).

Why "sic"
Because their
ancestors were
not Serbian

Of course things are worse under the dictatorship than they would be otherwise. One cannot appeal to the constitution, which grants religious liberty, because the constitution is abrogated. The will of the Bans at Shtip and Skopliye is the law. And they seem to have been instructed to apply the steamroller.

There is no
Ban as
Shtip.

I hesitate about sending you this letter. If I am quoted the Serbs will know that I got my information from the Protestants of Stroumitza and Skopliye and may further restrict their liberties or imprison and torture some of them. Temkovitch.... is now in Skopliye while Daskalovitch formerly at Radovish when the Church was burned is at Stroumitza. He told me that he fears for his life. When I was there the widow of a preacher who has been leading meetings at Velyousa (where she walks from the city Sunday mornings) was warned by a Serbian woman friendly to her, not to go any more as a Montenegrin had been set to kill her or do something worse to her.

Mr Daskell goes on to ask for League intervention, provided his friends can be safeguarded or not be placed in a worse position. ... He ends by saying that the Orthodox clergy are among the worst spies upon and persecutors of these harmless folk.

BRITISH LEGATION,

BELGRADE,

29th September 1934.

Dear Lord Noel-Buxton,

I return herewith the document you gave me to read with apologies for the blue pencil notes. I mislaid it that first day and have only just retrieved it.

I would make the following comments:

Haskell's visit took place four years ago.

I have no doubt there is much truth in what

----- Haskell reports but it certainly is not all truth and I fancy that the adherents of his American Evangelical Mission were pro-Bulgar in the sense that their education and training were acquired during the Bulgar predominance in Macedonia. Their information would consequently be biassed, and aim at making things out to be worse than they are.

He doesn't
But I think that Haskell's chief error is to attribute the misfortunes of his church to religious persecution. Though what Sitters tells you must also be taken with a grain of salt, since no national Church.....

The Lord Noel-Buxton,
c/o H.M. Legation,
SOFIA.



BRITISH LEGATION
BELGRADE

church likes rivals any more than the Anglican Church loves chapels and so forth, I have no doubt in my own mind whatsoever that those misfortunes were not the outcome of religious but of political persecution. It may be taken for granted that forty years ago these American Mission Churches were established under Bulgarian auspices and as such were regarded as centres of anti-Serb propaganda. Hence the persecution. What Sitters said about their having faded out through internal inanition was probably only so far true that the authorities, both spiritual and lay, being hostile, the population considered it wiser to abstain from either attendance or subscription.

Yes!

I am sure you had a very interesting journey and I hope only that it was not too fatiguing. It is a country with a future, if only it can get peace and be allowed - by Serbs and Bulgars, by pro-Serbs and pro-Bulgars, or by Italy and such like big fishers in troubled.....



BRITISH LEGATION
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troubled waters - to settle down, free from political
distraction, to that material effort which is needed for
its development and prosperity after its nightmare of
the past fifty years.

Yrs sincerely
Neville Henderson

WAR AIMS.

wh Henderson's comment. ✓
Simon defect? mistakes?
Hitler proved himself a dangerous aggressor by invading Poland, and we had to resist. Even those who think that Germany had a case, which ought to have been recognised, consider that Hitler's crime threw our own wrong-doing into the shade.

The public realises what it is fighting against, but not what it is fighting for. It accepts the reasoning of Harold Nicolson's "WHY BRITAIN IS AT WAR", and of Lord Lloyd's "THE BRITISH CASE"; but it is vague as to the settlement which it wishes to establish.

Being at war, we are moved by the instinctive determination to win, and our British optimism leads us to think vaguely that the war menace will be finally removed by giving the Germans the experience of another crushing defeat.

Our positive object must, of course, be to abolish the menace of war. We are not very clear as to the means of securing this object; but if peace can only be secured by a crushing victory, we must endeavour to get a knock-out.

It is frequently said that our war aim is "to win the war". Lord Halifax has good ground for defining our goal more closely. He describes it as guarantees of future stability. This is the supreme aim, and the urgent need is to estimate rightly the conditions likely to produce the best available guarantees of

permanent peace. The business of the Government, in conjunction with its Allies, is to seize the earliest moment at which these conditions become attainable.

Illusory Guarantees.

What guarantees of peace are possible?

It is generally accepted that no material guarantee can be absolute, unless America takes part as a guarantor. But hopes are placed upon the terms which can be dictated after victory.

In France, the dismemberment of Germany is advocated. Our own Government, however, is committed against this, having assured the German people that we are not aiming at the destruction of the Reich.

M.H. Impson. A haz roll to play in S Europ

Others look to a lasting military subordination of Germany; but few believe that it would be possible permanently to keep British garrisons on German soil. Others, again, hope that a generous peace would be granted after a knock-out victory, and that it would produce a peaceful Germany. But it is difficult to believe that, after a long war, such a peace would be possible. A war waged against civilians is likely to produce more, not less, hatred than that which made a generous peace impossible in 1919.

The question whether complete conquest is essential is fundamental. The experience of the last war throws some light on this problem. In 1917, Lord Lansdowne suggested negotiation,

without pursuing the war to complete victory; but the knock-out policy prevailed, and the war was pursued to the bitter end, at the cost of vast sacrifice. The result was not such as to encourage us to repeat the process. Humiliating defeat produced the Nazi movement.

Now, as in 1917, the best conditions for stability might well result not from complete but from partial victory. Complete conquest is not only unnecessary to our purpose, but positively undesirable. If the Germans suffer military disappointment, but not crushing defeat, this may prove a better means than overwhelming victory of producing a really good settlement, embodying the "guarantees" for which we are fighting.

On the other hand, it is essential that German aggression should not prove, as Lord Halifax says, to have been "good business". The war must be prosecuted up to the point at which aggression has been shown to be a failure. It will appear to Germans to be a dismal failure if, after the colossal cost and sacrifices of Hitler's war policy, Germany has to restore Poland (even without the Corridor) and Bohemia (even without freedom to make anti-German alliances). Total restoration, in every respect, of the 'status quo ante bellum', would be neither necessary to demonstrate the failure of aggression, nor conducive to subsequent stability. It would defeat our aims.

The choice of a war policy is a question of balancing the risks involved on either side. The 'war to the bitter end' policy involves many risks in the effort to succeed; but the strongest objection to it is that 'conquest' would be undesirable in itself. Above all, it is dangerous, because it sows the seed of further wars by inciting to revenge. The popular belief that complete conquest would lead to permanent peace is a delusion. Accordingly, it is dangerous to aim at such a crushing victory as would enable us to dictate the settlement.

Genuine Guarantees.

Are we, then, to despair of permanent peace? On the contrary, more genuine guarantees of stability are possible than those suggested.

- W.H. 9/15
1. The most effective of all guarantees would be German disinclination for war, and the degree of failure indicated above would provide the condition in which that disinclination could prevail. Failure to justify the immense sacrifices of war would discredit a repetition of the programme; provided that motives tending to war are not aroused by a humiliation such as that of 1918. Humiliation brings its revenges; the checking of aggression will be a salutary lesson, if it is not attended with the creation of vindictive feelings.

2. A further important guarantee would lie in economic interest. A sound economic settlement would link the interests of Germany with those of peaceful Powers. The pre-war position, especially because it limited German opportunities for export, was an incentive to war. The British and French Empires, with their systems of preferential trading, make material for propaganda which has a powerful appeal. This case would be met by placing colonies under some form of mandatory régime. The exporting countries (and notably Germany) would then stand to gain economically by pursuing a peaceful policy.

3. Germany, to be peaceful at heart, must have self-respect. Her pride was touched by exclusion from the colonial field and the denial of "equal status". If colonies are placed under mandate, and Germany has the prospect of a place on the mandating consortium after the war, another incentive to aggression will have been removed. The policy of mandation might well be adopted and put into practice forthwith. If such action were taken now, it would profoundly impress the German public, and weaken Hitler's war propaganda.

4. Another real guarantee would lie in the acceptance by Germany of a plan of disarmament. A Germany which actually joined in disarmament would have turned her back upon the whole

policy of domination. She would have retreated from the position hitherto adopted. Hitler prepared his public for disarmament by his Reichstag speech of October 6th.

5. Perhaps the greatest of all effective guarantees would be

with the 12th on more practical lines

Germany's participation in a European system of collaboration. It would be at once a linking up of her interests with those of the community, and an outward sign of her repudiation of the Lone Wolf policy of recent years. It would indicate that the policy of Hitlerism had failed.

6. The guarantee afforded by States which are now neutral is,

with the 12th if we ask her cooperation in peace making

of course, a vital matter. America's participation in a post-war settlement now looks probable; and if this hope is realised, a guarantee of extreme importance will have been furnished. It is also to be hoped that Italy, which seems to have moved somewhat from the Axis, can be brought back again into friendship with Great Britain and France. If so, her participation in a consortium responsible for arranging the eventual peace settlement would, of course, be a further guarantee of its durability.

Conditions for Negotiating Peace.

with the 12th avoid publicly talking of change of post. to wd change it.

If these are the true guarantees to aim at, it becomes easier to see the conditions on which negotiations for an armistice could be approached.

The Prime Minister declares that we shall need evidence of a change of heart in Germany. But what external actions will be taken to prove this change of heart, since confidence in Hitler's words has been destroyed?

Various conditions are advanced:-

1. a change of Government in Germany.
2. the withdrawal of German troops from Poland and Bohemia
3. the restoration of these States.

These actions would certainly be proof of German failure, but if the guarantees which give the greatest chance of stability are those which we have seen, it is they which should be mainly pursued. The three suggested armistice conditions just mentioned would have no value for permanent peace; for Germany will certainly recover her strength, and will be physically able to make aggression once more (unless America is a guarantor of the settlement). On the other hand, restoration in its fullest form might actually prejudice the conclusion of a stable peace; for, if Poland is restored with the Corridor, or if Bohemia is restored in such a form as to provide a possible base for hostile action in an area embedded in Germany, then the Germans will, in course of time, just as certainly break the peace as we ourselves should do, were Scotland detached from England, or Ireland made independent by enemy action.

There remains the question whether the concessions which we require need to be publicly accepted before negotiation.

One should recognise that, although Hitler has given no public sign that he is ready to make adequate concessions, this may be merely the result of a motive which operates on all belligerents, namely, the fear that if the desire for peace is displayed, the other side may become more intransigent, and the Government may lose face with its own people. Concessions could accordingly be more easily obtained in a conference than before one. By insisting upon preliminary public recantation, we may prolong the war beyond the point at which all that we need is really obtainable. It is only necessary that the Government should be convinced that the guarantees of real value will be secured.

It is, of course, objected that only actions, not words, can be trusted. But the Government can, without publicity, form an opinion as to the prospect of securing both the real guarantees of stability and also the conditions which constitute the failure of aggression.

Czech

BRITISH EMBASSY,
BERLIN.

Nov 27 1937

Dear Noel-Buxton

I was very pleased to see that you had made use of the Wellington quotation. It is terribly apt, though it would have been better on the lips of Lloyd George in 1919.

I think the Lord Isbitt was very useful. There are many obstacles to surmount, on both sides: but patience & goodwill may yet succeed.

Yrs sincerely

Neil Henderson

The Halifax visit - limited though its scope - may at least set the ball rolling in the right direction. If only the Press would help instead of hindering.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
BERLIN.

28th March, 1938.

Personal and Confidential.

Dear Noel Buxton,

Many thanks for sending me your memorandum about a plebiscite in the Sudetenland.

As you tell me that you have sent a copy to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State I hesitate to express any considered opinion on it lest it should be contrary to the official view. Nevertheless if you will take what I say as a purely personal and unofficial expression of opinion I will say this much:

(1) I would in principle rejoice to see your suggestion adopted.

Imagine that we had lost the war and Germany had created an independent Ireland and subjected the Northern Irish to Dublin. The Teuton does not love the Slav any more than the Ulsterman does the Catholic Celt. What would the feelings of the people of the United Kingdom have been towards Dublin rule over Ulster? So is it

to-day/

The Right Honourable
Lord Noel-Buxton.

to-day in Czechoslovakia as regards Prague rule over the Sudeten.

Believe me, I try to be objective. I hate the idea of Great Germany but I do not see (a) that on principles of justice and on moral grounds we have the right to oppose it by force, provided the limits set are just ones, or (b) that we can in the end prevent it even if we want to. By just limits I mean in effect self-determination, i.e. where a majority of the population of any given area desires union with Germany.

If we had compelled Schuschnigg to hold an impartial plebiscite in Austria a year ago, how much wiser it would have been. In a year or so's time we may be expressing the same regrets about Czechoslovakia. I am terrified of the Czech problem lest it means Great Britain being dragged into an ideological war that would not be defensible either on moral grounds or in the interests of humanity.

(2) As regards the desirability of pushing your

suggestion, /

suggestion, His Majesty's Government alone can decide. There are many difficulties in practice and if the Czechs had enough sense to devise themselves a plan which would make the Sudeten into contented citizens of a Bohemian State, it might not even be necessary to seek a solution by international intervention. If they cannot they will in due course certainly lose the Sudeten altogether or alternatively we shall be dragged into a perfectly futile preventive war which will be a disaster if we lose it and will alter nothing if we win it.

Yours ever
Herle Henderson



BRITISH EMBASSY,
BERLIN.

June 22, 1938.

Dear Noel Buxton

Yes, I do feel that it is important that the Germans sh'd realise that they may be up agst us if they try using force in C. Slovakia.

At the same time I am myself convinced that the last thing they want just now is war. It wld be immensely unpopular with the people, the army is not ready for it & Hitler has no desire to gamble. So provided there is no serious incident - such as the shooting of young Sudeten by Czech soldiers - I still believe that a peaceful solution will be found. Provided again Benes'

BRITISH
POST



is prepared to make big enough concession
to a minority - which he cannot hope
permanently to retain except as contented
citizens.

It's a nerve racking business: the
Germans are intolerable with their Press
& Radio campaign & the Czechs unsupportable
slow in making up their minds: & neither
they nor the Sudeten are worth a pinch
of British blood.

Yours etc.

Pericle Henderson

All we can do is to wait & see what Bones
will do, how far he will go & whether that will
be far enough to satisfy Hitler. P.H.

12th, Oct, 1938.

My Dear Henderson,

Let me first say that I hope you have had a holiday. If anyone deserves it, you do. I have naturally thought of you very often. When we met in the summer, it looked as if Germany would move, if Germans were killed and reform was delayed beyond the harvest.

As there was delay for many weeks more, I think we had a lucky and undeserved escape. If your advice and mine had been taken in July, there might have been an orderly solution, instead of extra suffering and a crisis. People must wish they had taken your advice.

But, perhaps, the crisis, causing the people to visualise war and enabling Hitler to see that German opinion would have been against him if he led to war, may be to the

(7-PTO)

yes. b'n c says cols again



BRITISH EMBASSY,

May 24. 38

BERLIN.

Dear Noel-Duxton

In the crash of all my efforts here in March I never answered or thanked you for yr letter of Feb 23rd enclosing yr article on a 'Settlement with Germany'.

"The breach of faith with the PM & the utterly unjustifiable action of Germany towards the Czechs broke all the things I had spent two years trying to build up in Germany. The

(PTO)

The German action has driven us back to what seems to them an encirclement once more. So we are back where we were only more so. For the moment I see no settlement. Either we have got to wait for some ¹⁰⁰ months till the clouds blow away again or there will be war. It all depends whether the Hitler is wise enough to realise that; or strong enough to keep his extremists in hand.

I agreed entirely with your article when I read it, but today the position is very different.

Yr. v. s.,
Nevil Henderson



June 20 '39

BRITISH EMBASSY,

BERLIN.

Dear Noel-Buxton

Many thanks for yr letter of May 26.
I have not known how to answer it, as
I shrink from putting my own opinions
on paper. To me it is all like a
Greek tragedy. If one begins to see
a ray of light, up comes a new cloud
& the darkness is greater than ever
before. The idea of March here a
staggering blow & my job out here has
become terribly uncongenial & thankless.
Not that I was not prepared for something
of the kind. The Czechs cannot exist unless
|| it be as satellites of Germany since their
Their

Geographical position makes any other form
of existence intolerable. But I did not anticipate
the destruction of their independence or the
cynicism & brutality of the German actions.

Yes on the whole I approved of the
Lushcliff correspondence. In principle entirely
though possibly the timing was of doubtful
utility. We do not want war, we would
like to be friends with the German people
we recognize Germany's need & aspirations;
but, the big But, we will resist force
by force. For the moment I do not know
what Hitler wants. He is waiting to see
what card this new deal will give him.

Yr. sincere

Philip Henderson

for W Henderson
2 June '39

BRITISH EMBASSY,

BERLIN.

Dear Noel Duxton

Since I wrote yesterday
I have read yr letter in the
Times of that date & if I may
say so entirely agree with it.

Firmness & Fairness is
what I have always pleaded
for. Until now we never had
any ^{physical} force behind our oral firmness
so that it wasn't much good
agst the aggressor. As for
fairness I often think that
prejudice & justifiable hatred of
wrong have hindered us to it.
We have often talked of

redressing grievances but we
have never done anything. If
we had been firm with Bismarck
last year we wd have been
spared much. If we say 'you
must not' to aggressors, we
have an equal right & duty to
say 'you must' to those who
seek to perpetuate the grievance.

The Polish case has terrible
resemblances to the Czech.

As for Russia I can't bear
to think of Britain sitting on
Stalin's mat. But the spirit of
England at any rate in the H. of C.
is dead. "Come the world apart
her England yet shall stand."
But I must leave many things
unwritten. Yrs. &c.

Neill Henderson