

Colonies



Letters to the Editor

JAPANESE POLICY IN CHINA

ACCESS TO OTHER MARKETS

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir,—I should like, if you can spare space, to meet the request contained in Mr. C. R. Buxton's letter in your issue of January 22, in which he asks me to go more into detail in respect of the statement that modification of Japan's policy in China might be brought about by altering some of the conditions affecting her access to raw materials and markets in other parts of the world.

To deal first with her access to markets. In his 1933-34 Report on Economic Conditions in Japan, page 93, Sir George Sansom, Commercial Counsellor at our Embassy in Tokyo, says:—

Obstacles in various forms have been placed in the way of imports from Japan in a number of countries in all parts of the world, and, although Japanese exporters continue to make strong efforts to surmount those obstacles, the means as are open to them, and the Japanese Government endeavours to assist those efforts by official action, it does not seem likely that exporters can do much more than maintain their present position.

It does seem likely, on the other hand, that in these circumstances Japan will reconcentre her efforts upon the market presented by China proper, which during the past 10 years has tended to diminish in importance, statistically speaking, as compared with the markets referred to above. It seems likely also that this reconcentration will seek to eliminate some of the causes which produced the tendency, among them boycotts, and to establish conditions specially favourable to Japan. Both these aims are, in fact, being pursued at the present time. Japan argues that if we, having established political control over large territories, use it to exclude her goods, she must place herself in a similar position, carrying with it similar powers.

She might modify her policy in this respect if we changed ours.

To deal next with Japan's access to raw materials. The Japanese Empire yields insufficient quantities of the raw materials necessary to modern industry or modern armaments, among them iron ore, coking coal, cotton, wool, lead, tin, aluminium, zinc, and oil.

While it is true that Great Britain puts directly no obstacle in Japan's way of buying these materials, conditions affecting Japan's acquisition of them are:—

- (1) The knowledge that in case of war the British Empire could do so; (2) the opinion that in other circumstances also existing obstacles might be increased; and (3) the effect which these possibilities have upon the mind of Japan, particularly her military mind. The Kuantung Army is seizing Chahar partly because it is believed to have large deposits of iron ore.

To take the third point first. The following is an extract from the record in my diary of a conversation last August with an official of the Japanese Foreign Office:—

He said that while we had interests in China—as had other European countries—Japan's interest was a life and death matter, the more so in view of the exclusion of Japanese from so many parts of the world—Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. It was clear that owing to the wide-spread nature of her interests Great Britain desired the maintenance of the status quo and the League of Nations was her instrument for achieving this. Japan's attitude towards Britain had passed through three phases: the first was admiration and friendship; the second was friendship crossed by misgiving; and the third—the present phase—was one of suspicion that Great Britain was opposed to the spread of Japanese civilization.

The disparity between these remarks and the realities of British policy as seen by ourselves, their lack of appositeness in relation to some of the economic actualities under review and the difficulty of giving to the words "spread of Japanese civilization" a meaning devoid of imperialism, do not rob them of their value as an indication of Japanese opinion and sentiment, especially when

considered in conjunction with Mr. Hirota's statements published in *The Times* of January 22, in the column headed "Japan's Aims Explained," under the crosshead "Need for Markets."

Moreover, as regards both my use of the word "directly" and the second point in the paragraph preceding the above quotation, is it not the case

(1) That artificial reduction of Japan's exports into British markets is an obstacle to her endeavour to obtain—to vary slightly an observation of Mr. Hubbard's on page 152 of his "Eastern Industrialization and its Effects upon the West"—a position in international trade which will give her an option on surplus supplies of raw materials;

(2) That, as pointed out in his chapter on Commonwealth Trade, "the observable trends are sufficient to show that Japan is becoming for them (the Dominions) an increasing magnet of trade" (*ibid.* p. 359);

(3) That this fact "is giving rise to a conflict between apparent economic expediency and racial and national loyalties" (*ibid.* p. 16); and

(4) That, having regard to our policy in the Crown Colonies, to the strong sentiment in favour of developing Empire trade which constantly finds expression in the United Kingdom, and to the actual increase which has occurred in Empire trade, Japan may fear the outcome of the conflict?

The problem is extremely complex, but if these points are collectively strong enough to constitute a case for changing recent decisions, action directed thereto might modify Japan's present policy, which, if carried to its logical conclusions, is likely to bring us and others into direct conflict with her.

I am, &c.,

E. M. GULL.

United University Club.

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# THE FUTURE OF EMPIRE

by Chas. RODEN BUXTON

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# THE FUTURE OF EMPIRE

by

Chas. RODEN BUXTON

**I**N this pamphlet I shall assume that the reader already appreciates the danger to world peace caused by the attitude of the "Dissatisfied Powers". I shall, therefore, confine myself to the question of what remedies are possible.

The period which I shall have in view, in any suggestions made, will be what I may call "the middle distance". I shall not deal here with proposals which would seem too idealistic for what most people consider "practical" discussion ; though they may have great value for some kinds of propaganda, as well as for clearing our own minds. On the other hand, I shall not confine myself to proposals which would be easily accepted by public opinion in its present state. Public opinion changes rapidly. A notable example is the readiness of the press and public to discuss the grant of economic facilities in the Empire to foreigners, and even concessions of

territory, since Sir Samuel Hoare's speech of September 11th, 1935; the mere mention of these subjects, before that date, would have aroused nothing but heated resentment in most Englishmen's minds.

Most people, when faced by this problem of the "Dissatisfied Powers", take for granted that nothing can be done to solve it except the "handing over" of territory. This is by no means the case. On the contrary, the transfer of territory should only be contemplated after other remedies have been tried—remedies which are more in accord with true international policy, and with the best tendencies of our time. These measures relate to economic openings of all sorts, to migration, and to participation in the development of the backward regions of the earth. They rest on the assumption that the best solution of this problem is not to rearrange the existing exclusive empires, but to move towards internationalism.

At the same time, when all is said and done, I cannot admit that we should exclude, from the first, the possibility of transferring territory, whether under Mandate or otherwise. This is a matter which concerns other Powers as well as ourselves—France, Belgium, Portugal, Holland. If we think of Britain only, I believe that a higher standard of administration is reached in certain parts of the British Empire than anywhere else; and I believe that the wishes of the Native populations, if they could be ascertained, would generally be opposed to transfer; so that there are strong reasons for avoiding this solution. But I cannot blind my eyes to the fact that territories (such as Jubaland) have on several occasions been transferred by our country, without a single person raising a cry of protest on the ground that the Natives had not been consulted. And I cannot

dispute the fact that the supreme need of preserving world peace might, in certain conceivable contingencies, override all other considerations.

Having said this, I return to my main point, that the exclusive empire, as we know it to-day, is not a form of government which harmonizes with the more enlightened tendencies of the modern world. Moreover, it is a form which has not always been favoured, and indeed was strongly opposed by all thinkers on colonial subjects in the middle of the last century. I am convinced that real progress lies in the direction of internationalism—a wider sharing both of privileges and of responsibilities. By moving in this direction, we shall be doing two things at the same time—promoting the interests of the backward peoples, and removing the grievances of Great Powers, with all the dangers they involve. What we want to see is a policy which secures both these great objects simultaneously—and the only policy which does this is internationalism. To hand over territory from one exclusive empire to another might somewhat reduce the disparity between the size of existing empires, but it would still leave these empires parcelled out among a relatively small number of Powers, selected from the rest for quite arbitrary reasons.

The ways in which we might move towards internationalism, within a measurable distance of time, might be summarized as follows :—

(1) An international convention on raw materials. It is natural to begin with this subject, as it was formally raised by the British Foreign Secretary in his speech at Geneva on September 11th, 1935. It is not true that there is no grievance. Generally speaking, producers are ready enough to sell, but in several empires the sale

to home purchasers is, or has been, encouraged by differential export taxes, and numerous schemes for raising the prices of particular commodities have shown how great are the possibilities of restriction in the interest of a limited group of producers. The convention should provide for a survey of existing supplies and facilities, and should set up some sort of permanent commission to make recommendations for fair distribution. It should also provide that consuming countries should be consulted whenever any restrictive measures were contemplated.

(2) All possible steps to break down the obstacles to international trade, protective tariffs, quotas, exchange restrictions, and preferences, including the Ottawa Agreements of 1932. All nations would then be able to sell their products, and thereby to purchase their raw materials. On this great subject there is only one opinion among the competent authorities of the League of Nations, and at every Conference where the international standpoint has been honestly taken up. One important step in this direction will be considered below under the heading of Mandates. "Increased business" is of more value in the long run, even than temporary prevention of unemployment in a time of depression.

(3) Greater facilities for Migration, not confined to tropical areas. The first need is for more thorough investigations by the League Secretariat and the I.L.O. The next thing is for a World Conference in which all claims would be frankly stated and all possible remedies freely discussed. The third is for a permanent international commission on migration.

(4) Extension of the Mandate System to all colonies of primitive culture. Even taking the Mandate System

as it is, this would be a measure of vast importance—even more from the point of view of Native interests than from that of the Dissatisfied Powers. But every effort should be made, in addition, to strengthen the System itself by adding provisions as to land, labour, taxation, education, concessions, white settlement, and so forth.

On the question of the "Open Door", Lord Lugard has made a proposal of a more limited range—that an "economic equality clause" should be instituted for all such colonies, and that its application should be supervised by the Mandates Commission.

(5) Direct administration by the League of Nations. This must be regarded as a matter of experiment, but it is of the utmost importance that the experiment should be tried. It would be easiest to apply where there is already a fairly developed system of Native administration, requiring supervision from above by a small number of officials. In the long run, it would require an international training college for colonial administrators. The resources of the whole world could then be drawn upon for the difficult task of administering the "backward regions". The experiment might be applied to a certain territory, or to certain special services, such as Medicine or Agriculture.

6 If it is found impossible to deal with the problem adequately by measures of the above kind, then the question of transfers of territory under Mandate, or even without Mandate—or perhaps the grant of new Mandates in territories not at present under control of any empire—must be faced.

But there should first be an International Conference or series of Conferences in which the whole problem of the Dissatisfied Powers should be faced. It would not

all these are v British in Ceylon

be of less momentous importance than the Peace Conference of 1919. The clearing of the air which would come from the free ventilation of all claims would be of incalculable value.

In conclusion, it may be asked whether the British Empire has any special contribution of its own to the solution. Surely it has. As the Power which controls one-quarter of the earth's surface, it is surely incumbent on us to give the lead in every one of the spheres which have been indicated above. Our example would be the greatest influence in the world, as our responsibility is the greatest. Two great measures are clearly indicated—a return to our old tradition of Free Trade, and a voluntary acceptance of the Mandate System for all our colonies of primitive culture.

*Price 1d. per copy, 9d. per dozen. Obtainable from the Friends' Peace Committee, Friends House, Euston Road, London, N.W.1, and the Northern Friends' Peace Board, Spring Bank, Randon, near Leeds.*

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ADVISORY COMMITTEE

RAW MATERIALS, ETC.

Section V: Methods of Procedure.

by C. R. Buxton.

The first question, and the most important question of all, to determine is whether the subject dealt with above, or any part of it, should be made the subject of inter-Governmental discussion immediately, or should be held up until there is what is described as a "calm atmosphere". It is highly improbable that such a calm atmosphere will prevail for a very long time to come, so that a postponement of this kind might very well mean a postponement for ever. There is every reason for hurrying on the discussion of these problems. It is a matter of common experience that the best chance of getting a subject discussed is at the time when it is, for whatever reason, in the public eye, and is being mentioned frequently in the newspapers. Ideally, it might be better to discuss it when no emotions and no prejudices were aroused, but, as a matter of fact, that would mean that it would not be discussed at all.

The discussion of these problems should be definitely associated with the settlement of the Abyssinian dispute. This would be the best way to meet the charge that Great Britain is actuated by motives of pure self-interest in its League policy, and that, while willing to give away Abyssinian territory, she is not willing to make any concession at the expense of her own Empire.

The next problem is the order in which the various subjects which are dealt with above should be brought up for discussion. On many grounds it would be desirable to leave the questions of territorial change and the Mandate System for subsequent discussion, and to deal first with the questions of (a) raw materials, (b) access to markets, (c) migration.

The first stage is that of enquiry. Sir Samuel Hoare has stated that the British Government has already made an investigation into questions of raw materials. This should be published. Side by side with national investigations, international enquiries should be carried on.

The Council should request the Economic Committee of the League, in co-operation with any other Committee of the League concerned, to prepare a full report on questions of access to raw materials and related economic and demographic questions. It should invite them to make proposals for the effective application of the principle of the Open Door in all Colonies and all Mandated territories, so that non-colonial Powers may have access to colonial markets without discrimination. Such proposals should provide for international guarantees protecting the rights of Native peoples.

Examples of international enquiries into these matters which already exist are:

I.L.O. Studies and documents, Series O - Migrations; No.2, 1920/1924 (published 1926).

Proceedings of the World Population Conference, 1927, especially the speech of M. Albert Thomas on "International Migration and its Control". This Conference established a "Permanent International Union on Population".

International Institute of Agriculture. Study on the problem of bringing together idle men, idle land and idle capital.

Commission of Enquiry for European Union, Geneva, June 25, 1931 (Series of League of Nations publications. VII Political).

I.L.O. Permanent Migration Committee Report, January, 1934.

Economic Committee of the League; various documents on factors of Production.

The next stage would be the submission to the Council of the League of a definite scheme of re-arrangement in the matter of world resources. The Memorandum might be similar to that submitted by M. Briand, when he brought forward his scheme of European union. The utmost public discussion of the scheme would be invited.

The next stage would be the summoning of a World Conference to deal with the subjects named. It should be summoned, if possible, by the Council of the League, and should be organised by the League Secretariat. It should include, however, non-Member States.

At this Conference, more detailed questions of machinery should be approached, e.g. the setting up of a "World Resources Board", to make periodical surveys of the quantity and distribution of the world's food and raw materials, and to suggest methods, including migration, by which the needs of all countries could be met; the use of Article 19 of the Covenant for the revision of Treaties or the alteration of conditions; the setting up of some permanent Council or arbitral body to decide disputed questions of distribution, whether in relation to raw materials, markets or migration. It must be recognised, however, that the last proposal could only be made when the stage has been reached at which the nations are prepared to give up a considerable portion of their sovereignty.

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6, ERSKINE HILL,  
GOLDERS GREEN, N.W. 4 XI.

11th February, 1922.

Dearest Noel,

The book gets more and more interesting towards the close. The chapter on Korea is, I think, the best, and to most readers, of course, it will be very new. The one on Irak is good, except the almost unintelligible part about the 'amphitheatre' at the beginning!

The Armenian chapter is also good, except that it is too long in proportion to the others. It gives me the same impression as Wedgwood's chapter on India in his recent book, viz., that the whole book was written in order to bring in this chapter. The actual documents, at any rate, should be in an Appendix. I have made one or two comments. It seems to me making too great a strain on the world's credulity, to believe that the Turks had really absolutely nothing to fear, or suspect, from the Armenians during the War. It seems to me one of those cases where the hero of the story is made out so saintly, that nobody can believe in his existence at all.

re Trustees. We got Vee and Bertram to help us most readily. Unless we had got those two individuals, I very much doubt whether we should have started the Trust at all.

Yours ever,

Charlie

MEMORANDUM ON THE REFUGEE QUESTION.

- by -

Charles Roden Buxton.

7th June 1939.

In the present situation the new features are:-

- (a) the increasing desperation of the plight of the Jews remaining in Germany;
- (b) the strength of public sympathy, as evidenced by the formation of some 30 Local Committees, many of which are running Hostels and other ventures.

I submit that the time is ripe for a new effort to induce the Government to do something on a larger scale than anything hitherto contemplated.

The following points should be pressed:-

- (1) The Government must be prepared to spend public money on assistance to refugees. Hitherto they have invariably refused to do so, stating that this problem must be dealt with entirely by the "private organisations". The "private organisations", admirable as their work has been, are not capable of dealing with more than a fraction of the problem. It is fantastic to suggest that they could deal with the whole of it. This is the opinion of every person qualified to speak on the subject. Sir Neill Malcolm, then League High Commissioner for German Refugees, insisted more strongly on the point in his speech at the Evian Conference (July 1938) and in his published report. Sir Herbert Emerson, the present High Commissioner, Sir John Hope Simpson, Lord Hailey and many other authorities have insisted on it. Once Government assistance were assured, whether by H.M. Government acting independently or by participation in an inter-governmental loan, the whole situation would be eased and speeded up.
- (2) The main need, which holds up all the efforts to assist the Jews and other "non-Aryans" to leave Germany is for places of final settlement. The present procedure for investigating possibilities of overseas settlement is intolerably slow. While voluntary commissions are carrying out their investigations, the Refugees are deteriorating physically and in their minds. Government assistance in the investigation and preparation of the chosen territories for settlement and

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in the actual process of shipping the Refugees and settling them is required.

(3) The Government should be pressed to take steps to secure that the Inter-governmental Committee (set up at the Evian Conference in July 1938) should take action. The whole work which this Committee was intended to do has been left almost completely undone. The Chairman is a member of the British Government, Lord Winterton.

(4) Much greater pressure should be brought to bear on the Dominions. That they should do virtually nothing to help the Mother Country in this crisis is a grave dis-service to the Empire. They should be brought to realise how the world outside regards their failure to use their resources in this connection; and the discredit cast thereby on the British Empire as a whole. The point should be stressed that, properly used, the Refugees are an asset rather than a burden.

(5) If the above Points were acted upon the result would be an increased rapidity of movement. Many Refugees would be enabled to go straight from Germany to the country of settlement instead of burdening the British consular authorities with requests for visas; exhausting the available funds of organisations and private individuals in this country; and giving an excuse, justifiably or not, for the imposition of the system of "Guarantees".

(6) Government assistance in emigration would result in a lessening of the burden falling on the "guarantor", and a speeding up of the business of bringing over refugees. Much distress would thus be prevented among the generously minded public who often find their desire to give hospitality and help to Refugees hampered, and at times, frustrated, through the restrictions and the demands for a deposit for emigration purposes. The wells of sympathy which at present sometimes tend to dry up would thus be continually fed.

(7) The corollary of more rapid overseas settlement ought to be greater freedom to enter this country as transmigrants. Would-be emigrants should be enabled to come to Britain to carry out from here their enquiries about overseas settlement. The present arrangements whereby a number of prospective emigrants are brought over on a block visa to train at Richborough and elsewhere with a view to eventual emigration, should be carried out on a much larger scale. H. M. Government should undertake to cover at least part of the cost of emigration and settlement where necessary and to allow certain specified categories, who are trained for work in occupations where there is a shortage of British labour, to stay in this country.

(8) This country must adopt a far more generous policy as regards permits for residence and, in some cases, labour, in the United Kingdom. Sir John Hope Simpson, Director of the Survey of the Refugee Question published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, suggests that 50,000 should be allowed to settle here.

The prejudice that every immigrant represents an economic injury - a prejudice repudiated by every economist, without exception - should be vigorously combated. The policy of overseas settlement which, from a long range point of view, is the most important, should not be allowed to throw into the shade the alternative policy of "Infiltration".

(9) As regards Children, the present system, under which a very large proportion of the available Refugee funds, in particular the Baldwin Fund, has to be reserved for the possible cost of eventual emigration is most unfortunate. The result is that money which was meant for immediate relief of distress is left lying idle; that the number of children brought over is severely limited and that those wanting to help the children sometimes find themselves prevented since they are unable to shoulder the financial burden.

In view of the asset which will be represented by these children after they have had a greater or lesser number of years at an English school, and subsequent training in some useful occupation, H.M. Government might well declare its desire that when such children have no parents or other relations whom they are expected to join overseas, and where they are trained for occupations in which there is a scarcity of British labour, they should remain here and take up such work.

# PEACE THIS WINTER:

A Reply to Mr. Lloyd George

By CHARLES RODEN BUXTON

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The success of the Allied offensive has created a new situation. Peace could be made this winter with honour and success.

Not a "crushing" peace; not a peace which would enable us to exercise the right of conquest on a vast scale, and to deny to Germany "the free exercise of her peaceful endeavours." That could only be attained by the sacrifice of countless more British lives. But a peace which would secure the objects for which the British people entered the war; which would secure the complete evacuation of Belgium, France, and Serbia; which would go a long way towards establishing the principle of nationality; which would defeat all the plans of aggression and domination put forward by the Prussian militarists; which would lay the foundations of a permanent "partnership" for the settlement of international disputes. A peace which would be based, not upon revenge for the past, but upon sound guarantees for the future.

## COULD A REASONABLE PEACE BE ATTAINED?

If people in this country find it difficult to believe that such a peace could now be attained, the reason is that the Press has consistently misrepresented the position in Germany, in order to maintain the belief that peace is unattainable, and that there is no alternative to the indefinite continuance of bloodshed. Those who have followed such a survey of Foreign opinion as that published weekly for the past year by the *Cambridge Magazine*, will find nothing to surprise them in the conclusion here put forward.

Naturally, we should not expect a declaration from the German Government of the precise points it was prepared to concede. We do not expect this of our own or any government. It is contrary to the whole practice of bargaining. There is tall talk everywhere. As the journal of Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, recently put it, "What is certain is that Bethmann-Hollweg would say quite different things at the table from what he said in Parliament." (*Morning Post*, April 19, 1916.) But short of explicit declarations, the evidence that a reasonable settlement could be attained is overwhelmingly strong. It could be illustrated by numberless quotations. I need only give its main outlines.

First, there is the opinion of practically every impartial observer in neutral countries. Take, as one example, this sentence from a careful survey of opinion, communicated from America to the *Nation* of September 2nd: "Influential American opinion holds that British aims (e.g., defeat of aggression, right of small

nations, and agreement to prevent war) *being realisable*, further expenditure of life is unprofitable." Similar views might be quoted from almost every neutral country. American pro-Ally opinion, indeed, is becoming increasingly suspicious of our aims, just because it believes that our original and avowed objects could be attained, that therefore the objects for which we are now fighting must be new and aggressive ones, and that "if this temper should begin to get the upper hand, neutrals whose sympathies have been with the Allies will have to reconsider the whole question thoroughly as the war goes on." (See, *e.g.*, the *World* (June 22nd), *New Republic* (July 29), *Springfield Republican* (August 10)).

The desire of the great majority of the German people for peace on defensive terms is no longer disputed. One quotation may be given, which is noteworthy because, being from the Berlin correspondent of a Vienna paper, it must have been passed both by the German and the Austrian censorship. "We know we have the enormous majority of the German people with us when we express the wish that the Government should show itself ready to take any peace proposals into consideration, only excluding such as aim at the lessening or the degradation of Germany." (*Arbeiter Zeitung*, quoted in *Daily Chronicle*, August 14th.)

As to the probable attitude of the German Government, the following points may be noted:—

- (a) The German Chancellor's consistent refusal to lay down any annexation of territory as a condition of peace;
- (b) His statement of his ultimate aim—"the final peaceful regulation of European disputes"—in terms closely resembling those of Mr. Asquith and M. Briand.
- (c) The fact that he is being attacked with increasing violence by the Militarist parties as being in favour of a "premature and inadequate peace," the "leader, or tool, of the Anglo-phil party," "in league with the Socialists," and as having declared his willingness "publicly in the middle of the struggle, and before the beginning of any negotiations, to give up Belgium under merely negative guarantees"; and finally
- (d) His statement in the Reichstag (September 29th) of Germany's "readiness for peace negotiations," repeating previous statements to the same effect made on Dec. 9th, 1915, and various subsequent dates.

A careful study of the recent controversies in Germany leads to the conclusion that, if discussions were entered upon, they would be upon the general basis of the evacuation of Belgium, France, and Serbia, an autonomous or independent Poland, and security against commercial "strangling." Many other points would, of course, require treatment—Turkey, Alsace-Lorraine, &c. On all these points the military success of the Allies would give

them a powerful position in the negotiation. Broadly speaking, the lines followed would probably be those of the "Basis for a Just Peace" recommended for consideration by Sir Edward Fry and other leading men in this country.

To ask for such a peace is not to ask for "peace at any price." I do so, not because we *must* have some kind of peace, but because we can now get the right kind of peace.

### DOES THE GOVERNMENT AIM AT A REASONABLE PEACE?

It remains to ask: If a reasonable peace is attainable, why is peace not made? There can only be one answer—because the Government are not aiming at a reasonable peace. I do not profess to know the exact objects which they have in view. What I do know is that they must have other and further objects in view than those which the people of this country took up arms to secure. One of them, indeed, they have openly announced. They have "approved" the resolutions of the Paris Economic Conference, which involve the establishment of a commercial boycott against the Central Powers. To add this to our objects means to prolong the war long after it might otherwise have been ended. Beyond this, we are kept in the dark. But it is probable that the objects which the Government have in view include, in addition, one or more of the following—the annexation of most or all of Germany's colonial empire; the annexation of Constantinople by Russia; the annexation of the North Dalmatian coast by Italy; or possibly (to use Mr. Lloyd George's language) a "knock-out," without any defined object whatever.

If objects of this kind were not being aimed at, then peace could be attained; but no attempt is made to attain it. Nor is this the only evidence of the Government's attitude. They continue to take the steps most calculated to lead away from a reasonable peace, and not towards it, while they neglect many steps that might be taken in the right direction. They prevent free discussion of the aims of the war. They prohibit the organs of Moderate opinion from being sent abroad, while allowing the *Morning Post*, the *Spectator*, the *Financial News*, &c., to be used by the enemy, as they are in fact used, for the purpose of his propaganda for a "fight to a finish." They harp perpetually on the origins of the war (a subject on which there must necessarily be disagreement), instead of on the reconstruction of Europe (a subject on which a large measure of agreement already exists). They allow Mr. Lloyd George, by his talk of "vengeance" and "punishment" and "the sporting spirit," to play into the hands of every Militarist in Germany. As for the steps which they might take, but do not, why is there no clearer definition of objects, no open repudiation of the Extremists, no appointment of a committee to study the complicated problems of the settlement? Why is there no careful and effective public explanation of the idea

of "partnership," once or twice alluded to by Mr. Asquith and Lord Grey? Above all, why is there no response to the epoch-making advance made by President Wilson in the direction of the "partnership" policy?

The issue is now clearly raised between the original, legitimate, defensive objects of the war, whose realisation might lead to permanent peace, and the new, aggressive, and partially concealed objects, which would lead to the perpetuation of war in the Europe of the future.

It is no longer for Belgium, France, or Serbia that our sons and brothers are being called upon to fight. Belgium, France, and Serbia might be freed to-morrow. It is for commercial boycott or territorial aggrandisement or a mere "knock-out."

### **THE DEMAND FOR NEGOTIATION.**

This is a serious and menacing situation. The only escape from it is to be found in a vigorous expression of public opinion, both in Parliament and in the country, in favour of negotiation by the Allied Governments. The policy of an indefinite war and a dangerous peace is being pushed with the utmost vigour. The policy of a sound peace must be pushed also. Those who believe in it must act now, and must refuse any support to a policy of mere conquest.

There is an impression in the minds of those in authority that public opinion is unanimous for an indefinite prolongation of the war. The impression is untrue. Public opinion is not for "peace at any price," but it is ready to welcome any honourable means of bringing the present sacrifices to an end. Remove the censorship and the Defence of the Realm Act for a month, and public opinion would wear a very different aspect from what it does to-day. The announcement that negotiations had begun would be greeted, not with an outcry of protest, but with a sigh of relief.

To sum up: the gigantic military effort of the past months might earn its immediate reward by the conclusion of an honourable peace this winter. Shall it be allowed to do so? Or shall it be in vain, so far as an immediate peace is concerned? Shall it be nothing but an incident in a long series of such efforts—a mere tributary to the ceaseless stream of misery—the ominous prelude to sacrifices more bloody still, and culminating in that "patched-up" peace which exhaustion always produces in the end?

CRB's Pamphlet on  
"Secret Agreements"

CRB's own list	500
List of Speakers & Writers	50 <del>100</del>
Ministers of religion (Peace Negotiation Committee)	2500
List prepared by Chappelow	10,000
WEA Secretaries	100
List from N. Council of Civil Liberties	400
Members of Wesleyan Conference	550
Wesleyan Ministers (all)	2300
Schoolmasters in Labour Movement	200
Secondary School Teachers (special list)	200

per Rev  
J.C. Gibson

Net amount known

Income Tax paid by

500 a year in 1918 + in 1908 + 1913  
 1000  
 5000  
 10000  
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# "WE TOLD YOU SO"

THE horrors of to-day—from Manchuria and Abyssinia, right down to the thinly veiled intervention in Spain and the bombing of innocent civilians in China—are the direct outcome, the traceable result, of a state of affairs which the Labour Party has consistently condemned. They are the kind of horrors, moreover, which the Labour Party foresaw and prophesied—clearly foresaw and insistently prophesied—if its warnings were not heeded and its policy were not adopted.

Labour condemned the Peace Settlement, whose terms were already known in outline, in the declarations of the International Labour and Socialist Conference of Berne, 1919; of the National Executive of the Labour Party, June, 1919; and of the Annual Conference at Southport, 1919.

But this was not all. The attack on the Treaty of Versailles caused the Party to think out the whole problem of international relations. On the foundation of its criticisms of the Treaty, there arose a complete structure—an essentially and characteristically Labour policy.

What was the policy? Equal economic opportunity to be given to all nations. An international body to control the distribution of raw materials. Imperialism to be liquidated, in the sense that colonies were to be treated as a trust, under an international supervision in which all should participate.

As Brailsford wrote: "We conceived of the League as an economic authority. We refused to believe that wars could be prevented, and armaments reduced, if the Powers continued to follow a policy of economic imperialism, grabbing territory in order to monopolise raw materials."

Above all, the League of Nations was to be not a mere organ for "keeping the peace," but a "legislative" body. It was to be used to secure, not only the immediate revision of the Peace Treaties, but a continuous process of bringing about the greatest possible equality in the sharing of the world's resources and opportunities. Disarmament would be the natural concomitant of these conditions.

In *Labour and the Peace Treaties*, we read: "An international or supernational authority established for the maintenance of peace should not be a mere alliance of Governments for the maintenance of a *status quo*, perhaps unjust and unworkable, or a mere instrument of coercion for ensuring compulsory arbitration on the basis of an old international law, which was itself in-

equitable, but should be *mainly* an instrument for changing the conditions likely to lead to war. Its function, that is to say, should be not so much coercive as *legislative*."

The Labour Party declared that, if this policy were not carried out, war would be the result.

"A peace such as this," wrote Arthur Henderson, in *The Peace Terms*, "which offers the German people no possibility of economic recovery, no guarantee of justice

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## By Charles Roden Buxton

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or equality, plays straight into the hands of the reactionaries on the one side and the extremists on the other. The complete economic ruin of Germany will inevitably bring the downfall of the moderates, and a struggle for power between the militarist reactionaries and the extremists. The only certainty with regard to the issue of such a struggle is that it would be fatal to the peace and recovery of Europe."

The close connection between an "exclusive British Empire" and the threat of world war was clearly recognised. "It is equally certain," wrote Leonard Woolf, "that another world war will result, if the other nations see us adopt the policy of attempting to reserve the riches of the Empire for exploitation in the interests of 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom and a few million inhabitants of the self-governing Dominions. Imperial Preference is completely incompatible with any kind of lasting peace."

The documents in which this policy was outlined form a very remarkable series. Taken together, they constitute, in my opinion, the finest and the most far-seeing declaration of policy which the Labour Party has ever produced. Many of the best heads in the Labour Party were engaged in the work. Arthur Henderson was the coordinating influence as well as the most effective mouthpiece of the Labour policy.

Norman Angell wrote *Labour and the Peace Treaties*, a booklet of some hundred pages. H. N. Brailsford wrote *Unemployment, The Peace and the Indemnity*. Leonard Woolf wrote *International Economic Policy*. These were but a few notable examples.

The horrors of to-day are the latest links

in a chain of events which began with the Treaty of Versailles, and the failure to make the League an instrument of justice as between the nations. That chain of events may be traced through the fearful psychological injury inflicted on the German people, the Ruhr invasion, the deepening economic distress and the lowering of the standard of living (in many countries), the incentive given to the dictators to connect these evils with the injustice of the foreigner, right down to the acts of aggressiveness, gradually increasing in insolence and recklessness, which we see to-day in Spain and China.

I contend that, if this is so, it is not enough to say that we cannot go back to the past, that we must take things as they are, and must concentrate our efforts entirely on the present situation, without paying any regard to its causes.

This may be the best tactics for the National Government, which is itself responsible for the disastrous deterioration of the past. It is not wise policy for the Opposition, whose record is clean, and whose policy has always been, and is still, an alternative policy for the country—the only policy which can save the country. What madness to forget it all!

Moreover, an Opposition is not concerned primarily with the detailed measures to be taken from day to day. These depend largely on inside information only available to the Government. An Opposition can afford to concern itself more with the underlying or "long range" needs. This is the course which the Opposition should steadily and consistently pursue.

What does this mean in practice—here and now? It means that, while meeting the emergencies of the moment, you must *at the same time* open up a new line of diplomacy—an international New Deal on Labour lines. You must open up the whole question of justice between nations in the distribution of the world's resources. This involves readiness for so-called "sacrifices" on the part of the British Empire, as of other Empires.

This New Deal must not be made a condition of good behaviour on the part of this or that particular nation. It must be treated as an altogether separate sphere of diplomacy. This is a hard saying, I know. But it is fundamental.

The wrong remains. Its consequences remain. The evils of the moment cannot be eliminated until their causes are rooted out. You cannot dodge the mills of God.

FINCH

Dec 20 21

Keep

Dear W.

I have made a number of notes, or marks  
to attract attention, in various places. I assume  
that it is of rough, & further revision is intended.  
Personally, I am rather out of sympathy

with the attempt to put the good side of  
Imperialism. But you have decided on that, so  
I don't enlarge upon it. Your favourable remarks  
have, to me, <sup>an</sup> a flavour of naivete which  
quite spoils their effect!

I find chs II & III more interesting  
than ch I. I should be strongly inclined

to drop ch I altogether - replacing it  
perhaps by a much shorter preface -

Why?

and also to drop the later chapters on the  
European Minorities, making it exclusively  
non-European.

But we shall have opportunities of talking  
further about it.

Yours  
C.A.S.

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22nd December, 1937.

Dear Charles Roden Buxton,

I have made most of your alterations in the enclosed draft, but I would make a very strong appeal to you not to press for the withdrawal of the Declaration in the General Act of Berlin. My feeling about this is that the paragraph in question recognises that Powers are only in a territory by the permission of the people of the countries concerned. In all conscience we have got few enough of these official Declarations in our armoury and therefore we ought not to lose this one.

Secondly, I do not see how in equity, having admitted the foregoing, Colonial Powers can refuse to consult the natives by an impartial Commission of Enquiry before re-transferring territories entrusted to them. As you know, I am very anxious to get going the new Conference for which provision is made in the Treaty of St. Germain. With this weapon in hand, we

ought to be able to make considerable demands on behalf of the natives. In short, to abandon this ground would I think be a great mistake, but we must carry you with us.

I was not able to put in quite the word you wanted about Native Parliaments, but I have embodied part of the actual words of the South African Schedule. I hope you won't feel that I have stretched matters too far by talking about Native Legislative bodies. What I have in mind there is the Kukiko of Uganda and the Pitsos of Bechuana-land and Basutoland, all three of which are something very different from mere Native Councils, they being legislative bodies empowered in each case to impose taxation and control expenditure.

Anyhow, I hope that you will be able to accept the letter as it stands, but it has to come up before the next Committee meeting.

Yours sincerely,

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